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ABSTRACT 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF  
CHINESE AND TURKISH ECONOMIC REFORM POLICIES  
IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
 
Lee, Sun A 
 
MA., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Duygu Sezer 
 
September 2006 
 
Though with different strategies and responses, yet all continue to share the 
same difficult task of development in this given conditions of globalizing world. My 
thesis compares and contrasts the reform history of China and Turkey under the 
overarching system of globalization as an attempt to find out better ways to achieve 
development. Although their socio-economic and political systems differ, China and 
Turkey have entered the world of globalization by launching the reform policies 
almost at the same time period and both faced the same elements of risks and 
opportunities generated by this system. My thesis utilizes the methodology of 
compare and contrast to examine China’s dualistic strategy of state regulation within 
an open economy and Turkey’s primary economic strategies based on the private 
enterprises to deduce that too much liberalization, especially in the field of financial 
market, could cause a slow-down to, if not harm, the economy. The thesis concludes 
with the speculation on how such success of Chinese economy could come to a halt 
if further liberalization especially in the form of capital account liberalization 
continues in the future. 
Keywords: Turkish Economy, Chinese Economy, Development, Globalization, 
Economic Reform Policies, State Regulation, Liberalization, Financial 
Liberalization, Socialist Market System, Financial Reform. 
 iv 
 
 
ÖZET 
KÜRESELLEŞME SÜRECİNDE  
ÇİN VE TÜRKİYE’NİN EKONOMİK REFORM POLİTİKASI 
 
Lee, Sun A 
 
Yüksek Lisans, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Duygu Sezer 
 
Eylül 2006 
 
Küreselleşme koşulları altında her ülke farklı tepkiler gösteriyor ve farklı 
stratejiler uyguluyor olsa da gelişmeyi devam ettirmek her biri için kaçınılmaz, zor 
bir görevdir. Bu tez, küreselleşme süreci içerisinde Çin ve Türkiye’nin ekonomik 
reform tarihlerini karşılaştırarak ileride gelişmeyi sağlayabilecek daha verimli 
yöntemler bulabilmeyi amaçlamıştır. Politik ve sosyo-ekonomik sistemleri 
birbirinden tamamen farklı olsa da, Çin ve Türkiye küreselleşme sürecine sistemin 
oluşturduğu benzer fırsat ve risk unsurları ile yüzleşerek aynı zaman diliminde 
ekonomik reformlar yaparak girmiştir. Bu tez, Çin’in açık ekonomi içinde devlet 
yönetmeliğinin ikilik stratejisini ve Türkiye’nin özel sektöre dayalı öncelikli 
ekonomik stratejilerini inceleyerek, özellikle finans sahasında fazla liberalleşmenin, 
bir ülkenin ekonomisinin yavaşlamasına neden olacağını ve hatta ekonominin zarar 
görebileceğini gösterir. Bu tez, kapital hesaplarının fazla liberalleşmesinin Çin’in 
ekonomik başarısını nasıl durma noktasına getirebileceği spekülasyonu ile sonuçlanır. 
 
Anahtar Kelime: Türkiye Ekonomisi, Çin Ekonomisi, Gelişme, Küreselleşme, 
Ekonomik Reform Politikası, Devlet Yönetmeliği, Liberalleşme, Finansal 
Liberalleşme, Sosyal Piyasa Sistemi, Finansal Reformlar. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Review the old and deducing the new makes a teacher. 
--- Confucius 
 
Examining different developmental paths of different countries allows us to 
make an analysis of better ways to development in this given conditions of 
globalizing world. My thesis would attempt to meet this goal by comparing and 
contrasting the reform history of China and Turkey. Although both have been 
influenced by the overarching system within which the process of globalization 
proceeds, the way they responded differ, both in their respective strategies to 
opening up to the world economy and in the degree of implementing such strategies 
in their own economies. 
 At first sight it may seem like a puzzle to try to compare the two countries 
organized around two different socio-economic and political systems – China being 
a socialist Marxist-Maoist system under one party rule and Turkey being organized 
around capitalist and basically liberal socio-economic concepts and institutions. 
Both, however, have entered the world of globalization emanating from their 
 2 
fundamental respective economic system by launching the reform policies almost at 
the same time period—late 1970s and early 1980s. It was the time when the 
globalization process began to accelerate with full speed, disseminating the 
principles of liberalization around the world, and China and Turkey were given the 
same elements of risks and opportunities generated by this system. Though both 
responded by agreeing upon the necessity to reform the existing economic 
conditions, however the way how they coped with these risks and opportunities 
differed, and it is these very different strategies of the two countries that provide us 
with lessons to be learnt.1 For both countries the main objective was how to achieve 
development from the underdeveloped situation. 
China, just like many other countries facing the task of development, has 
faced similar pressures engendered by the post-World War II capitalist system, and 
thus has had to reorient itself toward the world economy. The initiation of the “open-
door” policy under Deng Xiao Ping since late 1970s involved a shift away from 
central planning toward giving a greater role to market forces, expanding its foreign 
trade at the same time. Turkey also has begun to accelerate its reform process 
towards outward-oriented strategy since late 1970s, abandoning its mixed-economy 
strategy and trying to further liberalize its economy in the following years. However 
there exists a huge difference in the process, the difference marked by both the 
degree of stability and the specific structure of the political influence on the 
economic sphere, defining which would be one of the major tasks of this thesis. 
                                                
1
 Some might argue that comparing the political economy of a socialist country with that of a country 
whose economy operates in the system of capitalist economy might not produce so a scientific results 
as expected. I would counter-argue that the case of Chinese economy is comparable to any other 
economies in the capitalist system since hereby we are talking about the forms and the consequences 
of the economic policies, not the ideologies behind them—the part which we will be dealing with in 
analyzing the comparison, not the comparison per se. As Gao argues, one shouldn’t confuse the 
difference between market economy versus socialist market economy, and capitalism versus socialism 
(Gao, 1996, 6). Thus comparing the two different strategies under similar external pressure is more 
than valid. 
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The keyword of China’s strategy, however, was state regulation whereas in 
Turkey the primary economic strategies put emphasis on the private enterprises. If 
both countries began their reform processes at the same time period, the effort of 
China was to save, not to dismantle socialism. Such dualistic characteristic of 
Chinese developmental history contrasts the Turkish case where full liberalization 
was the main motto throughout the decades of its reform history. These two different 
strategies implemented in the age of globalization and financial liberalization that 
make up the core of the process today have been the major reason behind the more 
success of one and the opposite of the other. 
How about today? Would the success history of China with its praiseworthy 
strategies continue? China during last few years has been predicted to be the new 
leading power in the future, having truly astonished other countries also undergoing 
development. However as my thesis indicates, the further the globalization proceeds, 
the stronger the insistence on the requirements needed in order to intensify this 
process including the pressure for further financial liberalization, the less apparent 
such successful performance will be. Globalization has come to a stage where no 
more regulation is allowed. Therefore the tips of development that Chinese 
experience has offered to other developing countries, such as Turkey, will be 
weakened as the current advantage of domestic manipulation becomes no longer 
possible.  
The research is divided into four parts. Following the Introduction, Chapter 1 
examines the background history of development and globalization to give a brief 
idea on in what kind of system these economies function today. In Chapter 2, we will 
be examining the background of the reform history of China and Turkey including 
their different ideological background. This chapter allows us to understand how two 
 4 
countries came to both enter the development process as globalization intensified. 
Chapter 3 compares the reform strategies of the two countries, putting emphasis on 
how regulative policies of China led to more success than the liberal policies of 
Turkey. An emphasis will be put especially on the different financial strategies of the 
two countries, and the recent changes. The research concludes with the speculation 
on how such success of Chinese economy could come to a halt if further 
liberalization especially in the form of capital account liberalization continues in the 
future –the lesson Turkey has been teaching since the beginning of their reform 
history. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
 DEVELOPMENT AND GLOBALIZATION 
 
 
 
You can’t catch a cub without going into tiger’s den. 
--- Ancient Chinese Proverb 
 
Development has been the task of all “developing” countries since the end of 
World War II, having gained its momentum with the beginning of decolonization, 
however the task still remains unfinished and yet unclear. The ambiguity of the task 
is evident when we consider that no countries start off on the equal footing nor do 
they share common pathways. Each country possess distinct political and economic 
structure of its own, thus creates its own path of development in accordance to its 
intrinsic footing. The task becomes even further confusing with the continuing 
change in the meaning of “development” per se, thus making it more difficult for the 
countries to define what it is that they are really pursuing. However it is in this 
complex but diverse development process of different countries that we may find a 
hint, although may not be the best model, to achieve better economic conditions of 
the developing countries. 
Since the end of the World War II, the experiences of the developing 
countries revealed there exist several categories of development policies that we may 
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put as different development theories. 1950s and 1960s experienced the spreading of 
structuralist development theory which emphasized the importance of the role of the 
state in contrast to that of the market. Then re-emerged neoclassical development 
theory which refuted the role of the state, but firmly believed that development could 
be achieved only by giving the market full control of the economy. The commonness 
of such theories seemingly diametrical to each other, however, lies in the fact that 
both acknowledged that there exists a clear-cut dichotomy between the role of the 
state and the role of the market. They both understand them in relative terms that the 
increase in the role of state would mean the decrease in that of the market.  
Institutionalist development theory, which emerged since late 1980s and the 
beginning of 1990s, emphasizes on the validity and availability of once-opposite two 
terms – strong state and market. That state intervention in order to direct the market 
economy is possible is the major theme of the institutionalist development theory. 
Based on the belief that the priorities of industrialization bypass that of market 
rationality, the “strategic industrial policies” of these countries of late 
industrialization required strong protection as well as the guidance of the state in 
order to achieve their aims within these market-oriented economies (Onis, 1998, 198). 
Chalmers Johnson’s concept of the “capitalist developmental state” reflects such an 
attempt to understand the development history of the Third World. His idea on the 
concept is based on the belief that economic development constitutes the foremost 
and single-minded priority of state action (Onis, 1998, 199). The state is well aware 
of the underlying commitment to the market, thus the market and the elite economic 
bureaucracy mutually coordinates its policies for the ultimate outcome (Onis, 1998, 
199).  
 7 
Robert Wade and Alice Amsden further develop Johnson’s model. Wade’s 
“governed market theory”2 based on the importance of the role of government in 
setting the conditions for implementing its strategic industrial policy parallels 
Amsden’s argument that the state instruments of control of investment and its high 
degree of selectivity brought the East Asian success.3 The institutionalist theorists 
interpreted the economic success of the developing countries during the 1980s and 
1990s, such as East Asia, as the consequence of applying institutionalist policies, 
having strong belief in bureaucratic autonomy and the coexistence of public-private 
cooperation. 
Recently the categorization of theories as aforementioned has been debated 
based on the argument that they only reflect economic aspects of development 
expressed narrowly in economic terms. The success of the failure is usually 
measured through the various numeric data indicating the status of their micro and 
macro economic frameworks, such as high GDP per capita, better trade, and high 
efficiency of FDI. Such a “traditional” understanding of development has been 
facing new challenges as the world became more and more complex, and so has its 
interactions. Such a complex and more intimate interactions often referred to as 
globalization have redirected our focus on the task of development of the “now-
developing” countries.  
One of the critics of such categorization of development theories is Joseph 
Stiglitz, who criticizes the traditional concept of development as too “economic” 
focusing narrowly on the capital stock and improving the allocation of resources, the 
view which embraces both the leftist economists who advocated the stronger role for 
                                                
2
 Robert Wade. 1990. Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East 
Asian Industrialization. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
3
 Alice H. Amsden. 1989. Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea’s Late Industrialization. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
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governments in the 1960s and the rightist economists who favored market in the 
1980s (Dunning, 2003, 79). Such strategies, according to Stiglitz, saw development 
as a technical problem requiring technical solutions, but did not take into 
consideration the societal dimension or the fact that the laws of economics were not 
universal (Dunning, 2003, 79). For Stiglitz, we should now understand development 
from a new paradigm. Development today represents change and transformation of 
society and embraces a social, moral and environmental dimensions as well as an 
economic one. He argues that development embraces a move from traditional to 
modern ways, such as acknowledging that change exists as a means to further control 
of individuals and societies to influence over their own destiny (Dunning, 2003, 77).  
Though the examination of two countries that will be done in this thesis is 
based on such “traditional ways,” as to put according to Stiglitz, utilizing numerical 
data since they were the only sources available and credible, taking into 
consideration such an alternative vision of development offers us an opportunity to 
better understand to which direction the countries having passed through past 
development strategies should be directed in the future. Before I go on to examine 
China and Turkey as the two representing cases for my thesis, an introduction to the 
current politico-economic environment of the world would be necessary, since 
examining the development process would be meaningless without knowing within 
which framework such a process has taken place. This leads us to study the current 
trend of globalization which has offered the major playground for the countries with 
the task of development, whose norms and rules we would be examining in the 
following. 
 
 
 9 
2.1 History of Globalization 
Globalization is not a recent phenomena. International trade and financial 
openness has existed ever since late 19th century. According to some scholars, such 
as Hirst and Thompson, the concept of globalization per se is a wrong word to 
indicate today’s world politico-economic trend (Hirst and Thompson, 1999). They 
argue that what we are witnessing today is not a process of globalization, but a 
deeper internationalization which has been continuing without any significant change 
since late 19th century. They maybe correct in a sense that globalization, in a literal 
sense, should involve supranational elements such as global system that subsume 
national economies and entities, which in the end would lead to established global 
governance. However I would ignore such a strict distinction of usage based on three 
arguments.  
First, the public usage of the term should not be ignored especially if the term has 
become a widely understood norm incorporated within the professional works of that 
field. Such a view is also endorsed by Andreas Busch, that the distinguishing of 
‘inter-nation’ and ‘global’ as in Hirst and Thompson manner only serves to different 
analytical purposes but in the end refer to the same thing (Hay, 2000, 45). Second, 
although the process of globalization has been continuing ever since the end of 19th 
centuries, the clear difference does exist between the process of late 19th century to 
early 20th century and the one today.4 Thus it would be too exaggerating to say, as in 
Hirst and Thompson manner, to round up the two periods as equal and to denote in 
consequent that Globalization is the wrong word of indication. This leads to my third 
argument to advocate the usage of globalization, that other terms to separate the 
“Second Globalization” as Daniel Yergin calls exist and has been widely used by the 
                                                
4
 See the transcript of the IMF Economic Forum, September 22, 2004. “Why Globalization Works,” 
Washington, D.C.: IMF.  
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experts in the field. Thomas L. Friedman also offers another example of such 
classification of eras within the process of globalization that if the first era from the 
late 1800’s to World War I could be classified as Globalization 1.0, and from the 
1980’s to 2000 as Globalization 2.0, then the era that we’re now in is Globalization 
3.0, based on the argument that the speeding of the technological development has 
resulted in shrinking of the size of the world (Friedman, March 04, 2004, New York 
Times). Whatever names scholars might give, the phenomenon surely reflect and is 
incorporated within the globalization process, rendering the usage of the term 
acceptable. 
Though no exact definition of the term exists, various political and economic 
indicators suggest what and how the phenomenon consists of. The changes have been 
taking place mainly in economic sphere.5 Facilitated by development of technology, 
the mode of production became more international, limiting the role of national 
governments in manipulating the economy. The increasing amount and the mobility 
of capital that shapes and is shaped by a global capitalist system have become the 
pivot of the open and free market system. Various indicators should be examined in 
order to understand and measure the phenomenon of globalization, such as the rates 
of exports, world trade, foreign direct investment and corporate profiles, and other 
financial market indicators (Hay, 2000, 35). 
By the early 1930s, the disintegration of world economy began with the 
collapse of world financial system, then based on Gold Standard which the United 
States abandoned in April 1933 (Gill, 1988, 133). The experience of Great 
                                                
5
 Not all share this view. Some view globalization as a newly emerging phenomena based on the 
spatial concept: that globalization indicates “deterritorialisation” and the globality should contain 
“supraterritorial quality” and should transcend geography (Scholte, in Shaw, 1999). However such an 
approach contains the danger of leaving out the parts and parcels of what the phenomena contains, but 
instead only focus on the external shape of the globalization. Thus such an approach is insufficient to 
explain either how such a phenomena came to take place, or to which direction it should be led. 
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Depression in the 1930s and the disaster of World War II brought in the notion of 
Keynesianism into play, which criticized the classical economics assumption of 
market based economy built upon the principle that the balance between supply and 
demand would ensure full employment. The government was to play a larger role in 
managing aggregate demand and ensure full employment, leading to the reformed 
capitalism or managed capitalism. An effort was put to bring back the Welfare State 
and the New Deal launched in the 1930s.6 As Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw 
phrases, the state was to control the “Commanding Heights” of its national economy 
(Yergin and Stanislaw, 2002). The notion of “mixed economy” emerged, 
characterized by strong, direct government involvement in the economy and an 
expansive welfare state which reached its peak in the 1970s. However the high 
inflation rate in the 1970s and the oil shock threatened the Keynesian assumption of 
positive government’s role.  
With Margaret Thatcher coming to power in 1979, the notion of 
neoliberalism swept the world since 1980s. Under the theme of “TINA” (There Is No 
Alternative), Thatcher influenced by Friedrich von Hayek began preaching the notion 
of “competition.” (George, 1999). ‘Free market’ became the dominant ideology and 
privatization and liberalization became the major means to achieve the goal of 
development. The breakdown of Bretton Woods system in 1974 with the United 
States putting an end to the pegged exchange rate system to move towards floating 
exchange rate system only strengthened such a neoliberal movement. The IMF and 
the World Bank which themselves once have been the “brain-children” of Keynes 
(George, 1999) established at Bretton Woods in 1944 as a means to aid the countries 
with temporary balance of payments problems, now converted themselves under the 
                                                
6
 Such a shift from laissez-faire to a more direct interventionism implied, as indicated in Karl Polany’s 
The Great Transformation, “a historic change in the relationship between society and the market, and 
the state and capital in the major capitalist nations” (Gill, 1988, 132). 
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neoliberal doctrines and the advocacy of the United States. These institutions began 
to embrace opening the markets of developing countries, advising them to implement 
privatization, and reduce any forms of government subsidy or control etc.  
In the mean time the term “Washington Consensus” emerged to represent the 
close cooperation among the US Treasury, the Wallstreet interest, and the 
IMF/World Bank in pursuing such neoliberal goals. The term “Washington 
Consensus” was first formulated by economist John Williamson in 1989 named after 
a list of 10 policy recommendations for economies of countries undergoing reform 
process (Naim, 2000, 1 of 10).7 Whether the usage of the term today is compatible to 
this original intention is a matter of dispute. Whatever evolution the term has passed 
through, the “Washington Consensus” after decades came to mean “a general set of 
policy recommendations” that embodied the views of the IMF, World Bank, U.S. 
Treasury and think tanks (Naim, 2000, 2 of 10). 8  The negative experiences of 
developing countries only led to the deprivation of its reputation, as Naim calls it 
“Washington Confusion” (Naim, 2000, 8 of 10).  
In terms of international economic environment, liberal international 
economic order has been continuously promoted by various international economic 
                                                
7
 These original ten propositions designed by John Williamson for Latin American Countries were:  
1. Fiscal discipline 
2. A redirection of public expenditure priorities toward fields offering both high economic retur
ns and the potential to improve income distribution 
3. Tax reform 
4. Interest rate liberalization 
5. A competitive exchange rate 
6. Trade liberalization 
7. Liberalization of FDI inflows 
8. Privatization 
9. Deregulation 
10. Secure property rights (Williamson, World Bank Research Observer, Vol.15, No.2 (August 
2000), p. 252). 
8
 Naim indicates that the reason why the term Washington Consensus came to acquire “a life of its 
own” and came to be so frequently misused is due to the policy makers during the 1990s 
implementing an incomplete version of the model, in addition to the changes in both international and 
domestic economic and political environment (Naim, 2000, 2 of 10). Williamson strongly expresses 
his discontent toward the term being used today as the “synonym” for neoliberal market 
fundamentalism (Williamson, World Bank Research Observer, Vol.15, No.2 (August 2000), p. 256). 
 13 
institutions since the World War II, or international finance institutions (IFIs), such 
as General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, which was replaced by World 
Trade Organization since 1995), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World 
Bank (WB). Such an attempt towards freer trade and exchange rate stability brought 
about huge increase in the world trade as well as real world GNP by 1980. Between 
1950 and 1980, real world GNP increased four-fold and world exports as a 
percentage of global GNP rose from 11.7 percent to 21.2 percent (Gill, 1988, 145). 
Amongst such a development, what play the major role in shaping today’s 
globalization is the phenomena involved in the liberalization process of financial 
markets. As many contemporary scholars argue, the past developments in the sphere 
of financial markets have been “revolutionary” (Hay, 2000, 40). It is with this rapid 
change in the financial market that the debate on the impact of globalization has 
become more controversial. This notion of financial liberalization is especially 
important since, as my thesis would confirm, it is the major factor which has decided, 
and would decide, the course of many developing countries’ developing status. 
 
2.2 Financial Liberalization 
The international economy since 1945 was based on the fixed exchange rate 
system in which other currencies were pegged to the US dollar which in turn was 
pegged to gold. Flow of financial capital was predictable through this way, thus 
rendering stability in the international finance flows. However, with the breakdown 
of the pegged exchange rate system in 1974, all restrictions on international capital 
movements were eliminated, triggering “the modern infrastructure of speculation” 
(Eatwell, 1996, 5). Thus began a rapid increase in the global flow of financial capital. 
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From $10 billion9 and $20 billion in 1973, the daily foreign exchange trading around 
the world exploded to $1250 billion in the 1980’s and 1990’s (Eatwell, 1996, 1 and 
3). 
Financial liberalization has become the key-word for indicating today’s 
globalization process.10  As Erol Balkan and Erinc Yeldan indicate, globalization 
accelerated with the improvement in technology during the 1970s has come to 
indicate the following two phenomena:  
1) liberalization of the commodity and financial markets at the national 
scale 
2) elimination of all the administrative and regulatory statues hindering the 
free movement of international capital flows (Balkan and Yeldan, 2002, 
40).11 
The policies dominating the current process of globalization regarding this 
huge flow of financial capital have been to liberalize the financial markets, aiming to 
abolish the financial regulations that different countries used to impose on their own. 
Some of the major means through which the financial liberalization could be 
implemented include interest rate liberalization, enhancing market competition, 
privatization of major banks, and deregulation of foreign exchange control (Garnaut 
and Guoguang, 1992, 227-230). Such a shift to free capital mobility has often been 
criticized, however, for making the country’s economy vulnerable to hot-money (or 
                                                
9
 Unless any additional notes are given, the unit of amount indicated by the $ sign in the text 
represents the US$. 
10
 Ziya Onis emphasizes the relations between globalization and financial liberalization that 
“globalization of the world economy finds its most complete form in financial markets” (Onis, 2000, 
1).  
11
 Elimination of any regulatory policies is mainly based on the view that economic intervention in 
any form leads to inefficient, thus slow economic growth, especially in the stage when industrial 
policy is under process, and when the development has passed its initiative process and is being 
achieved gradually (Garnaut and Guoguang, 1992, 226). 
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short-term loans) circulation, which consequently results in various financial crises.12 
Especially when considering the very nature of hot money flows which is preferred 
in a country less stable both economically and politically than the others who are 
more stable enough to attract long-term capital such as foreign direct investment, the 
potential crises from sudden huge outflow of capital is unprecedented.  
It is in this very nature of international capital flow, motivated by the 
spectacular prospects of short-term capital gains, that renders close integration with 
the international financial market risky for late-developing countries (Onis, 1998, 
515). To quote from the UNCTAD 1998 Trade and Development Report: “the 
ascendancy of finance over industry together with the globalization of finance has 
become underlying sources of instability and unpredictability in the world economy. 
… In particular, financial deregulation and capital account liberalization appear to be 
the best predictor of crises in developing countries.” (UNCTAD, 1998; v, 55 in 
Balkan and Savran, 2002, 50). 10 developing countries had to undergo major 
financial crises between 1994 and 1999 alone, in some cases bringing about chained 
result of political turmoil (Naim, 2000, 4 of 10). 
IMF has been the major target of criticism due to its active involvement in 
promoting financial openness in the developing countries.13 It has been argued that 
under the name of “Global Principles”, IMF together with the World Bank seek to 
                                                
12
 Such huge amount of short-term capital flows based on speculation has been argued to be the major 
reason behind 1997 East Asian crisis. According to the World Bank, total private capital flows to the 
five crisis countries (Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand) were more than 
$100 billion between 1996 and 1997 (World Bank. 1999. Global Economic Prospects and the 
Developing Countries, 1998/99, Beyond Financial Crisis. Washington: IMF, 55). It is even more 
surprising when considering the capital inflows to these countries in 1994 amounted to $41 billion and 
the capital outflows in 1997 to $12 billion (Bhagwati. 1998. “The Capital Myth: the Difference 
between Trade in Widgets and Dollars”, Foreign Affairs 77(3): 8). 
13
 IMF and the World Bank have acknowledged their role in shaping such policies in the world 
economy in the World Bank/IMF Development Committee’s Communique (April 28, 1999): 
“Ministers noted the important contributions of the Bank and the Fund in current efforts to strengthen 
the architecture of the international financial system through their participation in the formulation of 
international standards, principles and best practices.” 
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produce “uniformity of principles and practices” such as free trade, tighter budgets, 
high interest rates, liberalized financial flows, deregulation of business and 
privatization (Suzuki, 2001, 319). The main criticism lies on the fact that such 
uniform devices offered by the international financial institutions (IFIs) do not take 
into consideration the diverse conditions of the developing countries, ignoring the 
unique and different characteristics of each of them. Accused of pushing for financial 
liberalization in the countries who are not yet ready to adopt such a system, and once 
in crisis not offering anything but to force higher interest rate as the universal 
solution, IMF policies together with those of the other players taking part in the 
Washington Consensus have been the major concern for those aware of the danger 
behind financial liberalization.  
How has IMF responded then? As expressed in the IMF Issues Brief 
published in April 12, 2000, they admit that in the short-term, volatile short-term 
capital flows may threaten macroeconomic stability. 14  Admitting that the crises 
would not have developed if not for their exposure to global capital markets, they 
argue that nor could these countries have achieved such impressive growth without 
those financial flows. To quote Raghuram Rajam, the Economic Counsellor and 
Director of the Research Department at IMF:  
“We do know that uncontrolled liberalization (…in particular capital 
accounts) without building appropriate institutions, at least some 
modicum of institutions, can be dangerous. But at the same time, you 
have to recognize the opposite problem, which is if you don’t liberalize, 
                                                
14
 “Globalization: Threat or Opportunity”, An IMF Issues Brief, April 12, 2000. 
(http://imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2000/041200) 
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is there pressure to build those institutions, or do you have a permanent 
state of status in the institutional framework?”15  
The similar view has been expressed by Kristin J. Forbes, a member of U.S. 
President’s Council of Economic Advisors during the same conference:  
“…we do discuss movement toward free capital flows and 
opening up capital accounts, and our approach is that in the longer term it 
is certainly in the countries’ best interests to move towards the free 
movement of capital and open up their capital accounts. Getting there is 
obviously the tricky part. There are risks as you open up your capital 
account…But it’s a very important topic, and we certainly don’t have the 
last word, either.”16 
As a reaction to such pressure to open up financially, some developing 
countries chose to close their economy and keep their state-controlled financial 
system under mono bank structure giving state the major power to control investment 
as was the case of China, at least until 2003, and some coped with such pressure by 
implementing full financial liberalization as was the case of Turkey.  
As we would examine in the following chapters, this financial liberalization, along 
with other mechanisms of economic liberalization, and the way how these two 
countries responded play the major role in determining the development future of 
China and Turkey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
15
 Transcript of an IMF Economic Forum, “Why Globalization Works”, Washington, D. C., 
September 22, 2004. 
16
 Ibid. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
THE BACKGROUND: PRE-REFORM COMPARISON 
 
 
 
The strength of a nation derives from the integrity at home. 
--- Confucius 
 
Comparing any two countries’ history of political economy with similar 
background of liberal economic framework is a task, though educative, not so 
distinct. In this sense, comparing China and Turkey is very important, that though 
both started their reform process in almost similar period, China’s launch for reform 
was a very radical attempt due to its very different ideological background. China 
began its reform as a socialist system under one party rule whereas Turkish reform 
was organized around capitalist and basically liberal socioeconomic concepts and 
institutions. Examining the backgrounds of these two countries gives us an idea of 
what fundamental steps have been laid before that led to the reform process. 
 
3.1 China 
Just as all the other war torn countries during the 1950s, China and Turkey 
were striving to find ways to promote economic growth. In the beginning, 
Communist China under the leadership of Mao Ze Dong chose to adopt the basic 
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Stalinist political system and economic development model by nationalizing all 
economic, cultural, and social entities and had a “single party-state political-
economic-social bureaucracy” run them (Hamrin, 1990, 11). The Maoist strategy 
was aimed to give priority to heavy and capital-intensive industry and give emphasis 
on over-centralized, top-down ruling system. However it didn’t take long for China 
to realize the difficulty of implementing such Stalinist mode of development. 
Among various reasons, extraction of resources from agriculture to support the 
growth of industry saw its limit due to China’s poverty. Lack of skilled personnel, 
poor communication and transportation links, and its geographic differences made 
central planning even more difficult (Hamrin, 1990, 12). The Stalinist mode has 
become the target for revision as the voice of complaints began to spread not only 
within the elite but also among the populace. Thus by the end of 1960s, it has been 
realized that the first initiation to reform was inevitable, the effort that still continues 
until today. 
However, it is worth reconsidering some of the elements of Maoist strategy 
during this period as it is to a certain degree in concert with the major ideologies that 
lie beneath the recent development strategy of China today. Mao interpreted 
economic development as a matter of given task at the national level, that a country 
(possibly indicating the developing countries) should draw up its developmental 
policies making use of its own socioeconomic realities relatively independent from 
the outside world (Friedrich Wu, 1981, 451). Such a way of thinking is well 
reflected in one Chinese Community Party declaration: 
 
In accordance with its own concrete conditions, China must rely 
first of all on the diligent labor and talents of its own people, 
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utilize all its available resources fully and in a planned way, and 
bring all its potential into play in socialist construction. Only thus 
can it build socialism effectively and develop its economy 
speedily (Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, 1963, 368 
in Friedrich Wu, 1981, 456). 
 
What should be underlined is that the concept of self-reliance as understood 
by the policy-makers of China, at least since then until today, is clearly 
distinguishable from the concept of autarky. Mao himself emphasized self-reliance 
as the major guiding principle of China’s economic development policies in the 
1950s in the following manner: “The correct method is each country doing the 
utmost for itself as a means toward self-reliance for new growth, working 
independently to the greatest possible extent, making a principle out of not relying 
on others, and not doing something only when it really and truly cannot be done…” 
(Mao, 1977, 103 in Friedrich Wu, 1981, 456). It was important to find a reasonable 
mixture of independence and interdependence. However the percentage of the 
mixture kept changing especially with the rise of Deng Xiaoping and the continuing 
reform process since his period. As Mao puts: “the study of universal truth must be 
combined with…the concrete reality of China” (Mao, 1956, 82 in Friedrich, 1981, 
457). 
Though China emphasized the importance of being as closed as possible, 
self-reliance was not self-isolationism (Friedrich Wu, 1981, 452).17  International 
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 Though in theory the two were supposed to differ, the Maoist strategy in practice in the following 
years proved to have confused the two, whose policies reflected more autarkical characteristics as 
later considered to have been more of “self-isolation” than “self-reliance.” The good example of such 
extremity could be the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution launched in the mid 1960s by Mao, 
which now is often branded as an exercise of xenophobia (Friedrich Wu, 1981, 461). A more flexible 
way of interpreting the concept of self-reliance was to be revived under the new leadership of Deng in 
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exchanges were kept as well as the inflow of external assistance (Friedrich Wu, 
1981, 452). What Chinese considered important, though whether it is being 
implemented in reality is a matter of dispute, was to draw a reasonable line between 
the two: keeping which form of international exchange, and to what degree would 
best keep China’s domestic order of economy were the key issues to be dealt with. 
Such a way of thinking to a certain extent, extends until today. China’s evolving 
open door policy always had in mind which sectors to keep under tight protection, 
such as financial market, and which sectors to widely open – the policy that is 
credited for the economic successes of the last two decades. 
In 1958 the Great Leap Forward was implemented by Mao who began to 
accelerate collectivizing the urban and rural economy. The communes were created 
which allowed the bureaucracy to extend its hand to rural affairs, and decision-
making power was decentralized to the provincial-level bureaucracies in pursuit of 
more rapid, localized development of China’s internal resources (Hamrin, 1990, 12). 
Mao sought low-cost improvement in agricultural output through mass labor 
mobilization campaigns and local low-technology industries (Hamrin, 1990, 15). 
The basic idea behind such policies was “regional autarky and national isolationism” 
and as Hamrin puts, there was no change in “the monolithic mode of management 
by administrative command” (Hamrin, 1990, 13). 
In the immediate post-World War II years, given the historical situation of 
Cold War era, it was tempting enough for China to lean towards the Soviet Union 
for economic aid and military protection. However the newly developed Maoist 
                                                                                                                                     
the late 1970s. Under Deng’s leadership, learning from foreign countries and self-reliance are not 
contradictory but complementary if done in a “principled and planned way” through the maxim of 
“first, use; second, criticize; third, convert; and fourth, create” (Beijing Ribao (Beijing Daily 
Newspaper), July 3, 1977, in Friedrich Wu, 1981, 465). Since mid-1979, the notion of “self-reliance” 
began to be replaced by a Chinese version of interdependence rhetoric decorated by such terms as 
“international cooperation,” “mutual benefit,” “equal exchanges,” “supplying each other’s needs,” etc 
(Friedrich Wu, 1981, 468). 
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ideology of self-reliant developmental strategy convinced China to alter its policies. 
As Mao put it, again emphasizing the importance of ‘unique policies of Chinese 
characters’: 
 
In those days [1949-1957]…we copied almost everything from the 
Soviet Union, and we had very little creativity of our own. At that 
time it was absolutely necessary to act thus, but at the same time it 
was also a weakness – a lack of creativity and lack of ability to 
stand on our own feet. Naturally this could not be our long-term 
strategy. From 1958 we decided to make self-reliance our major 
policy and striving for foreign aid a secondary aim (Mao, 1962, 
178 in Friedrich, 1981, 459). 
 
This move away from Soviet Union since late 1950s symbolizes China’s first step of 
radical departure which in the near future would develop into the form of what is 
called “Socialist Market System.” 
While Mao’s version of the revision of Stalinist mode was being put into 
action, at the same time, more moderate reform programs have been planned by 
reformers such as Zhou Enlai and Chen Yun. They sought gradual organizational 
change through regular bureaucratic means and put emphasis on financial realism 
and overall coordination and balance among different economic sectors as well as 
geographic regions (Hamrin, 1990, 13). They favored agricultural and light 
industrial production, and creating export regions along the coast (Hamrin, 1990, 13). 
However these plans only remained as plans, never implemented until the death of 
Mao, partly due to the increasing tension between China and the United States 
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(which made it too risky for the economy to ignore military aspects), and mostly due 
to Mao’s negative response to such proposals.  
However several factors allow us to see that such yet-to-be-implemented-
plans were destined to be revived, which we now know that they did after Mao’s 
death. As White explains, the excessive concentration on heavy industry between 
1950s and 1970s starved other sectors (White, 1993, 31). Recession after the Great 
Leap Forward killed 15 to 30 million people due to famine (White, 1993, 31). Slow 
rise in incomes, if not stagnating, fueled social discontent which began to pose 
serious political challenge to the Party leadership (White, 1993, 35). It was not only 
such internal conditions that began to seriously challenge the status-quo. The 
success of Japan and East Asia, including the success of Chinese communities in 
Taiwan, as they began to open themselves up to the international economy began to 
push Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime to again reconsider Chinese concept 
of national ‘self-reliance’ (White, 1993, 35). It was not only these economic 
elements that provided motivation to support proposals of reform economists. The 
weakening of Chinese Communist Party especially during Mao’s Cultural 
Revolution also played an important political role in the dismantling of the status-
quo. As White argues, the Party split, lost its ideology as well as its authority, and 
thus lost the confidence of society (White, 1993, 38). Another step for further reform, 
thus, was inevitable. 
 
3.2 Turkey 
Turkish economic policies throughout history mirrored the pragmatic 
responses to both internal and external politico-economic impacts that came mostly 
in inconsistent and unstable manner. Turkey experienced a short period of 
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liberalization during the immediate post-World War II period, in the early 1950s. As 
Sevket Pamuk argues, the background for such liberalization was laid during the 
1930s when the Etatism through its marketing monopolies benefited the nascent 
bourgeoisie.18 The private capital accumulation during the Second World War as the 
state reverted to deficit financing and taxation of the peasantry and non-Muslim 
bourgeoisie, gave the private fortunes to the hands of the Muslim bourgeoisie 
(Pamuk, 1981, 4). 
It was also the international environment that enabled Turkey to depart from 
the principles of Etatism to those of liberalism. Turkey joined NATO in 1951, thus 
aligning with the Western alliance. Tightened ties with the United States also 
allowed high level of resource flows available in forms of extended military and 
economic aid to Turkey from the United States. Internally, the breakdown of the 
monopoly of Republican Party in 1946 brought in the multi-party system. 
Parliamentary democracy was introduced and the freedom of speech and publication 
expedited the circulation of Western ideas. Democrat Party which came to power in 
1950 called for the transfer of the ownership of state economic enterprises to private 
capital, and promoted the agricultural sector.19 As a result of these developments, 
Turkey during the 1950s witnessed huge growth of private industrial enterprises. 
Such policies of Democrat Party was also sustained by opening up of new land, 
good weather conditions and expansion of demands for primary products such as 
wheat and chrome created by the Korean War (Pamuk, 1981, 11).  
As the experiences of the two countries reveal, China and Turkey seemed to 
go towards two opposite directions during the 1950s. China under Mao was going as 
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 See Sevket Pamuk, 1981. The Political Economy of Industrialization in Turkey: 1947-1980, 
Ankara: University of Ankara. 
19
 It is important to note that the huge expansion of agricultural output (45 percent increase in real 
terms) during this period is mainly due to the favorable weather condition between 1948 and 1953 
(Okyar, 1979, 335).  
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inward as possible, closing its economy completely from the outside environment. 
The developmental plans of China, although many attempts have been made for the 
revision, were strongly influenced by Stalinist mode of development. Unlike Turkey 
who tried to adopt itself to the changing world politico-economic environment, 
China was firmly closed within.  
Turkey, however, before moving on to further liberalization in 1980s, did 
experience a certain period of mixed economy. The sluggish growth and trade 
imbalances during the 1950s made agriculture based economy almost impossible to 
continue. By the mid-1950s, the decline in both world market demands for raw 
materials and in agricultural production led to the foreign exchange crisis20, which in 
turn led to the deterioration in the external terms of trade and export earnings, 
putting an end to this short period of liberal trade policies (Pamuk, 1981, 11). During 
the 1960s and 1970s, Turkey witnessed the return of mixed economy.21  
Giving back the power to the state with the rebirth of mixed economy 
embodies ample meanings. The belief in government’s role reemerged, that using 
the government economic sector as an investment instrument could enhance the 
economy in general (Okyar, 1979, 333). The state economic enterprises could be 
used in policies of regional development and of spreading industries to various 
regions which private enterprises could not achieve (Okyar, 1979, 333). Based on 
such expectations, Turkish State Planning Organization (SPO) was established and 
absorbed in the 1961 constitution as one of the constitutional organs in the Republic. 
The first two Five Year Plan adopted by the organization emphasized on improving 
domestic savings performance and restricting imports through various measures as 
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 It is worth noting that the primary mode of accumulation was agriculture based. 
21
 For the detailed reasons behind such a return of the mixed economy framework, see Osman Okyar, 
1979.  “Development Background of the Turkish Economy, 1923-1973,” International Journal of the 
Middle East Studies 10(3): 325-344. 
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quotas or licensing. The three five year plans were adopted for the period between 
1963 and 1977, and the first two plans for the 1963-1973 period put emphasis on 
improving domestic savings performance. In terms of its trade policies, the 
restrictive characters prevailed, in the form of import and export licensing, quotas, 
and high customs duties, supplemented with numerous surcharges and advance 
import deposit requirements (Kopits, 1987, 2).   
The return of such a mixed economy brought incredible economic growth to 
the Turkish economy, enjoying a vigorous economic recovery with high growth 
rates in GNP. From the 4.8 percent GNP growth rates in 1953-1963, the growth rates 
of GNP displayed gradual improvements: 6.4 percent in 1963-1967, 6.7 percent in 
1968-1972 and 7.2 percent in 1973 to 1977 (Dogruel, 1994, 38). The emphasis on 
improving domestic savings performance during the first two Five Year Plans led to 
marginal savings ratios of 32 and 26 percent respectively, which in turn decreased 
the current account deficit of GNP (Celasun, 1983, 9).  
Albeit its remarkable growth during the 1960s and the beginning of 1970s, 
Turkish economy faced a serious backsliding by the end of the 70s. We may 
attribute the 1978 crisis to both external and internal factors. Externally the first oil 
crisis in 1974 caused a sharp rise in imported oil prices. The oil crisis coincided with 
the reluctance of the government to adjust to the new international environment and 
to pass the deterioration in the terms of trade onto domestic prices of oil and other 
imported intermediate products led to significant internal and external imbalances 
(Dogruel, 1994, 44). Internally, during the process of what Dogruel appraises as the 
move from “easy” stage of import-substitution to the “complex” stage, Turkey failed 
to promote the domestic production of consumer durables and investment goods 
which required the implementation of high technology and the use of highly skilled 
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labor (Dogruel, 1994, 42).22  In order to preserve its growth momentum, and to 
finance the continuing expansionary policies, Turkey sought the solution in reserve 
decumulation and massive external borrowing (Togan, 1995, 5, Celasun, 1983, 11). 
We may conjecture the severity of the 1978-1989 crisis from the fact that annual 
growth declined from 4.0 percent in 1977 to 0.4 percent in 1979 (Celasun, 1983, 12), 
the current account of the balance of payments deteriorated from a surplus of US 
$0.7 billion in 1973 to a deficit of US $3.1 billion in 1977, and as a result, by the end 
of 1977 Turkey’s external debt totaled US$ 11.3 billion (more than three times the 
amount outstanding three years earlier) (Kopits, 1987, 3). Such serious drawbacks in 
Turkey’s economic standing characterized by the amount of accumulated short-term 
debts was worsened by the international climate following the hike in oil prices in 
1979 and 1980, leading to the domestic political and social instability (Togan, 1995, 
6). 
Turkey’s choice as a reaction was to consult to the open neoliberal policies 
which have just begun to spread around the international economic arena. The 
government introduced a series of stabilization programs under the guidance of IMF 
and World Bank. The comprehensive policy package introduced on 24 January 1980 
aimed at such factors as substantial increases in the prices of public enterprises; 
elimination of price controls for a wide range of industrial products; a major 
currency devaluation; improved incentives for exports; better conditions for foreign 
private capital; and a flexible policy for further exchange rate adjustment (Celasun, 
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 Turkey experienced two stages of import substitution strategy during 1950 to 1979. The first stage 
was replacing the imports of non-durable consumer goods by domestic production, and the second of 
intermediate goods and consumer durables by domestic production. This second stage involved highly 
capital intensive goods which required skilled and technical labor, and the high protection that these 
relatively large sized industries required was costly. The state had to protect these industries through 
various means such as tariffs, quotas and over-valued exchange rates which made the maintenance of 
such a system more costly (Togan, 1995, 5). Given the conditions that Turkey was not yet mature 
enough to produce such capital intensive commodities, such a nature of import substitution process 
harmed Turkey’s economy drastically. 
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1983, 13). The emphasis was on the “greater reliance on market forces” and 
outward-oriented economic policy, marking the turning point in Turkish economic 
history (Togan, 1995, 6). 
 
3.3 Comparative Analysis 
Few analyses could be made based on the two cases examined above. In 
both cases the international economic environment which these two countries had to 
cope with was only in its nascent stage of formation. Liberalization was the key 
word of the process but we do not see a strong external influence that makes these 
countries inevitable to take actions accordingly, at least not yet. Countries were busy 
trying to revive themselves economically from the war-torn conditions and building 
up their internal infrastructure.  
Moreover, economies though had transactions amongst each other, were not 
that much connected as the money transactions were not as free as they are today. It 
was only with the breakdown of Bretton Woods pegged exchange rate system in 
1977 that de facto (financial) transactions took place, spreading and enforcing 
further economic transactions, marking the beginning of how some scholars would 
term, the Second Age of Globalization. Until then, both China and Turkey, just as 
most of the other third world countries were, in a sense, free to decide what policies 
they intended to implement for their economic growth. One thing that is clear is that 
China, although pretty much wracked by Mao’s authoritarian policies during the 
Cultural Revolution, was in a more independent stance at the dawn of the reform age, 
whereas in Turkey with the involvement of IMF, it was in a much less independent 
stance, as could be seen in the following years. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
 EXAMINING REFORM ERA 
 
 
 
Once on a tiger’s back, it’s hard to get off. 
---Ancient Chinese Proverb 
 
This chapter focuses on comparing and contrasting the reform era of China 
and Turkey, including their different market systems, approach to the role of 
enterprises, agricultural reform, foreign direct investment, and their different 
reactions to the global trend of financial reform. The case of China and Turkey 
would be compared either in two different sub-sections or in accordance to the 
contents, would be described together without any sub-divisions. 
 
4.1 The Initiation to Reform 
China’s Reform Policy since 1976 
The initial stage of Chinese reform was taken in 1978 at the Third Plenum 
of the Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party which decided that it was 
time for China to depart from the previous Maoist strategies which seemed no longer 
viable to the backward economy of China. Although no strict plan was drawn as 
often been criticized by some scholars today, the advocators of reform in China 
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believed that the future would be brighter on the reform side than continuing the 
previous system. It was the continuous interaction between ideas, policies and 
practical results that was at the core of how the system functioned (White, 1993, 49). 
Though too ambiguous as it must have seemed at the beginning, such a mechanism 
functioned well: well enough as would be proven later on.  
Chinese reform process was different from that of most of other developing 
countries in the sense that the process not only meant means to improve the 
conditions of various economic indicators, but itself meant a huge total 
“restructuring” of the previous system as a whole. In order for the new system to 
work, China’s political structure had to be amended. The basic elements that once 
guided the politics of the previous planned economy system now had to undergo a 
fundamental change. As Deng reported to the Chinese Communist Party in 1988, the 
three fundamental changes achieved since 1978 were: 
 
1) the concept of developing productivity as a new goal has replaced the 
previous concept of a class struggle; 
2) China moved from isolation to open foreign policy to the outside 
world; and 
3) reforms enabled China overcome various economic problems (Waters, 
1997, 2). 
 
Maoist emphasis on national economic ‘self-reliance’ was replaced by the 
strategy of ‘greater openness’ to the international economy through liberalization of 
domestic economy. The proportion of foreign trade in the economy began to 
increase, foreign credits from both governmental and private sources were accepted, 
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direct foreign investment was encouraged through wholly-owned or joint ventures, 
and “special economic zones’ (SEZs) and ‘open cities’ were established (White, 
1993, 48, 49).  
The commitments to the emerging ideas of reform by the politicians were also 
strong. As Hua Guofeng (the second premier of PRC who succeeded Mao after his 
death and the leader of the Communist Party of China until being ousted by Deng 
Xiaoping) addressed to the Second Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress 
in mid 1979: 
 
Economic exchanges between countries and the import of 
technology are indispensable, major means by which countries 
develop their economy and technology. It is all the more necessary 
for developing countries to import advanced technology…in order to 
catch up with those economically developed…We hold that the 
development of economic, technological, scientific and cultural 
exchanges and cooperation among various countries on the basis of 
equality and mutual benefit will help to promote their friendly 
relations and preserve world peace (Hua Guofeng’s Report on the 
Work of the Government, June 18, 1979, in Friedrich Wu, 1981, 
468). 
 
Specialization, division of labor, interdependence and more liberal foreign economic 
policy were the major key words indicating the beginning of the new era of reform 
in China (Friedrich Wu, 1981, 469).  
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Thus began the long marathon of reform launched in rural sector during 
1979-1984 (Phase One) and the following urban-industrial reform during 1984-1989 
(Phase Two). It was with the government release of “On the Reform of Economic 
Structure” on October 20, 1984 when a significant step was taken from previous 
Soviet-style planned economy and a move towards opening China to the outside 
worlds was realized.  
It is important to note that reform policies in China, however, did not tend to 
implement market-only principles as the ones in the capitalist market system. 
Instead it was decided to reduce the scope of mandatory planning and expand the 
scope of “guidance planning” which increased the powers of enterprise managers 
and allowed more liberated price system as was the case of the second phase (1984-
1989). As more detailed examination of such reform periods would reveal, however, 
the state still remained as the major body to set the rules for the game.  
 
Turkey’s Reform Policy Since 1980 
 The first step of Turkey towards reform era was made under the assistance of 
IMF, the World Bank, and OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development) with the introduction of stabilization and adjustment programs on 24 
January 1980. Huge amount of financial assistance of these international institutions 
in return were to see Turkey break away from the previous import-substitution 
strategies to an open export-led and liberalized economy. The financial assistance 
from IMF amounted to $1.7 billion in special drawing rights (SDR) under a series of 
stand-by arrangement, and from World Bank amounted to $1.6 billion in the form of 
structural adjustment loans (Dogruel, 1994, 45). These stabilization programs in 
consistency with the “spirit of orthodox IMF” measures aimed at curbing inflation 
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and overcome the balance of payments difficulties (Hatiboglu, 2003, 119 and 
Dogruel, 1994, 45). The aim was to be achieved by cutting the Central Bank credits 
extended to the public sector which in turn resulted in immense decrease in public 
investment and spending (Dogruel, 1994, 45). The liberalization attempts included 
freeing of private sector prices, reducing agricultural subsidies, foreign trade 
liberalization and export promotion as well as move to a more flexible exchange rate 
regime.  
 Some of the major liberalization measures of Turkey since 1980 could briefly 
be listed as:  
1. Devaluation of Money and the introduction of new exchange regime based 
on daily changes of the parity of TL vis-à-vis foreign currencies. 
2. Abolishment of price control regulations. 
3. A tight monetary policy based on IMF recommendations.  
4. Liberalization of financial markets from regulations regarding deposit and 
credit rates which now operated in accordance to the markets. 
5. The abolishment of individual bargains between unions and firms, causing 
the decrease in the power of unions in determining wages. 
6. Liberalization of trade and freeing of international trade and foreign 
exchange operations (summarized from Hatiboglu, 2003, 120-122). 
As a result during the 1980s, Turkey has become a model country of liberalization, 
shown as the “paragon of export-led growth” (Dogruel, 1994, 46).  
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4.2 Socialist Market System versus Market System 
Uniqueness of Socialist Market System of China 
Reforming previous old system required bringing fundamental changes to 
the existing economic concepts. Moving on from a command economy to socialist 
market economy was one of them. The previous system of government control of 
the enterprises has made economy prone to become lifeless, consequently 
necessitating a new method to enhance productivity (Gao, 1996, 3). 
In the new system, the concept of ‘markets’ were no longer contradictory to 
‘planning’, but was considered to be utilized in order to serve the aims of socialist 
development (White, 1993, 46). The notion of ‘profitability’ and the ‘demand-led 
system’ came into scene: the former gradually came to play the role of the best 
indicator of enterprise performance (White, 1993, 46). These were the new basic 
elements that Deng had in mind when announcing his Four Modernization in 1978 
which embraced the modernization of industry, agriculture, national defense, and 
science and technology (Waters, 1997, 1).  
 By 1978, the idea of market economy prevailed over the previous system of 
planned economy. Such a step forward by Chinese policy makers is well reflected in 
their report to the Fourteenth Party Congress in 1977: 
 
If we want to establish a socialist market economic system, we 
should allow the market to play the essential role of distributing 
resources under the macro-control and regulation of the state. We 
should make economic activities follow the law of value, and 
adapt to the change of demand and supply. We need to distribute 
resources to enterprises that have good economic benefit, and 
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provide enterprises pressure and motivation, in order to select the 
superior and eliminate the inferior. We need to take advantage of 
the sensitiveness of the market to various economic signals, and 
coordinate relations between production and demand (Guangyuan, 
CE2003, 21). 
 
One should, however, keep in mind that the market economy that Deng 
Xiaoping had in mind was not the kind of market economy as Western model of 
capitalism. The notion of market economy in China that Deng had in mind was more 
of a “free market within a communist society” (Waters, 1997, 15). Such a way of 
thinking was possible since Deng in the very initial stage of reform denied that “the 
planned economy has a socialist nature…and that the market economy has a 
capitalist nature” (Guangyuan, CE2003, 20).23  
China’s successful economic development in the following years as the 
result of these reform policies are generally explained by reference to Deng’s ability 
to keep its socialist political structure while continuing to adopt the market system. 
Reform, thus in a sense, was limited to “economic” elements of both economy and 
politics. If general analysis is to be made, the basic ideology behind China’s socialist 
market system was, to put briefly, “progressive economy” but “conservative 
politics”; that is economic reform was to outrun political reform (White, 49). As 
many scholars would argue, the motivation behind China’s openness always has 
been to ‘preserve’, not to ‘dismantle’ socialism. There lies an important clue in this 
version of understanding Chinese socialist market system, as would be made clear in 
                                                
23
 There is no strict economic formula that should match the system of politics. As discussed in the 
introduction, the belief in the dichotomy of market economy versus socialist economy and capitalism 
versus socialism should be corrected (Gao, 1996, 6). 
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comparison to the case of Turkey: such a dualist approach was what enabled China 
to achieve so much success that Turkey failed to. 
 
Market System of Turkey (Trade Liberalization) 
In comparison to the socialist market system of China, the similar concept also 
exists in Turkey –Social State. As incorporated into the Constitution of 1982, Social 
State does not necessarily take the form of socialist state nor does it imply being 
“statist.” This could be seen from the fact that whereas it was the “statist” principle 
that was included in the constitution early in 1937, the constitution of Turkey in 1982 
clearly states the “Social State” as the main principle defining Turkey.  
Article2  Characteristics of the Republic: 
The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and Social State 
governed by the rule of law; bearing in mind the concepts of public 
peace, national solidarity and justice; respecting human rights; loyal to 
the nationalism of Ataturk, and based on the fundamental tenets set 
forth in the Preamble.24 
 Constitution of Turkey does not imply any specific form of economic system 
to be implemented. Thus the effectiveness of the Social State depends on the 
economic preference of the political authorities in power. Such notion of Social State 
in Turkey has been functioning in liberal economic system based on free competition 
and liberal market system. As elucidated in the constitution, the main aim of Social 
State is to safeguard the welfare of its citizen by protecting and recognizing their 
rights as: right to work, right to fare wage, right to social security, right to housing, 
right to medical care, and right to education.   
                                                
24
 http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/english/constitution.htm. 
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Article 5  Fundamental Aims and Duties of the State: 
The fundamental aims and duties of the State are; to safeguard the 
independence and integrity of the Turkish Nation, the indivisibility of 
the country, the Republic and democracy; to ensure the welfare, peace, 
and happiness of the individual and society; to strive for the removal 
of political, social and economic obtacles which restrict the 
fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual in a manner 
incompatible with the principles of justice and of the Social State 
governed by the rule of law; and to provide the conditions required for 
the development of the individual’s material and spiritual existence. 
In reality this has not been an easy task. Limited budget is one of the 
obstacles to full performance of these initiations.25 However I must emphasize that 
the embedded character of “system-neutral” Social State of Turkey per se makes 
such initiations even more difficult to realize. 
Turkey has integrated into the world economy since the early 1980s as could 
be understood from the trade liberalization history of Turkey. Previously, the import 
regime of Turkey during the 1960s and 1970s were regulated by annual import 
programmes. This annual import programmes consisted of three categories: the 
liberalization list, the quota list, and a list of commodities to be imported under 
bilateral trade arrangements. The liberalization list was separated into two: a free 
import list (liberalization list 1) and a restricted list (liberalization list 2). The 
liberalization list 1 usually contained commodities like raw materials and spare parts 
whereas the liberalization list 2 listed processed and semi-processed goods and raw 
materials. The commodities which were already domestically produced were in the 
                                                
25
 The proportion of budget transferred to social security organs decreased from 62% to 56% in 1999 
and 2000 respectively (http://www.turkhukuksitesi.com/makale_60.htm) 
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quota list. The system worked in such a way that the commodities once under the 
liberalization list could still be transferred to the quota list once the domestic 
production of the commodities begins. Even for those commodities listed in the 
liberalization lists, importing them involved complex bureaucratic procedures. 
Without any doubt it was more difficult for importing those in the quota list. In short, 
the domestic producers were given a complete protection under such a system. The 
system was under regulation during then. 
It was in the beginning of 1980s that the trend began to show some change. 
In 1981, the quota list which implied a quantitative restriction on imports partly 
phased out, and the commodities in the liberalization list 2 began to submerge into 
liberalization list 1. The Table below shows the declining share of commodities in 
the ‘restricted list’ (liberalization list 2) in total imports.26  
Turkey 
Share of ‘restricted list’ imports in total imports 
 Restricted Imports  
($ Millions) 
Total Imports  
($ Millions) 
Share of Restricted 
Imports in Total 
Imports (%) 
1970 192 948 20.3 
1971 260 1,171 22.2 
1972 413 1,563 26.4 
1973 178 2,086 22.9 
1974 697 3,778 18.4 
1975 1,163 4,739 24.5 
1976 1,143 5,129 22.3 
1977 1,160 5,796 20.0 
1978 784 4,599 17.0 
1979 973 5,069 19.2 
1980 947 7,909 12.0 
1981 831 8,933 9.3 
1982 272 8,843 3.1 
1983 163 9,235 1.8 
1984 17 10,757 0.2 
Source: Various issues of the Annual Report, Central Bank of Turkey, in Togan, 
1995, 12. 
                                                
26
 Though no strict statistics of comparison is available for China, the continuing importance of import 
restrictions in China throughout 80s and 90s is discussed in the third section of this chapter, 
Decentralization versus Privatization. 
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In January 1984, all imports were classified into three lists: the ‘prohibited list’, 
‘imports subject to permission’ and ‘liberalized list.’ The number of commodities in 
the ‘prohibited list’, which in the beginning contained some 500 commodities, 
decreased rapidly to three in the following year. Similarly, the share of commodities 
in the ‘import subject to permission’ also decreased; from 46.5 per cent of all imports 
in 1984 to 6.1 per cent in 1988 (Togan, 1995, 12). By 1990 both the ‘prohibited list’ 
and ‘imports subject to permission’ list phased out, leaving the ‘liberalized list’ as 
the only activator of the import regime.  
In order to promote exports, government offered several incentives such as 
tax rebates, preferential credits, and tariff exemptions on imported inputs and 
packaging materials. In addition, in order to counteract the limits of foreign 
borrowing, Turkey rescheduled its foreign debts under the condition of accepting 
IMF’s structural adjustment programme which was implemented on 24 January 1980. 
As a result of such export-promotion policy through exchange rate policy, credit 
policy and fiscal policy, Turkey’s exports increased from $2.9 billion in 1980 to 
$13.6 billion in 1991 (Togan, 1995, 22). Increasing export was also the result of 
devaluation of Turkish Lira, which was achieved through the appropriate exchange-
rate policy, which will be further dealt with in the following section.  
In short, Turkey’s liberalization in trade was achieved both through 
welcoming more imports and promoting more exports. Restrictions on imports were 
gradually removed as exports were encouraged by government through exchange-
rate policy, credit policy which extended credit at preferential rates of interest to both 
producers and exporters of selected products, and through fiscal incentives such as 
export rate rebates, exemption from the production tax (and later from value added 
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tax), and foreign exchange allocation (Togan, 1995, 22). One of the major steps 
taken toward Turkey’s effort to liberalization was realized with the enforcement of 
Customs Union between Turkey and the EU in 1996 (World Bank, 2003, 102). As a 
result of its Customs Union with the EU, Turkey adopted most of EU’s trade and 
competition rules including the abolition of all customs duties and charges on non-
agricultural items from EU and European Free Trade Association (EFTA), 
prohibition of all quantitative restrictions and implementation of a common customs 
tariff to third-country (including the United States). The Customs Union is a part of 
the greater picture of Turkey’s liberalization effort to integrate with the world 
economy, as have been with Turkey’s participation in the World Trade Organization 
as a member since 1995.  
 
4.3 Decentralization versus Privatization 
Decentralization in China 
Reform in China required decentralization in various dimensions of 
economy. Communist China ruled by a small central bureaucracy now had to 
undergo a significant change in dispersing its power to lower levels. This transfer of 
power from upper to lower level governments was based on the premise that 
allowing experience and knowledge-equipped local governments would enhance 
efficiency and productivity of the economy. The necessity for decentralization as 
initiated in the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP 
which marked the beginning of the Chinese reform is well emphasized in the second 
paragraph of the Communiqué of the Third Plenary Session: 
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“Now, the serious shortcoming of our economic management 
system is the high centralization of power. We should dare to 
decentralize it according to the direction of leadership, allowing local 
governments and industrial and agricultural enterprises to have more 
power for their own operation and management under the direction of 
the unified plan of the state…We should implement the system of 
responsibilities according to a division of labor and individuals, giving 
more power and responsibility to management and management 
institutions, reducing meetings and documents, promoting work 
efficiency, and carefully implementing the system of examination, 
reward, punishment, and promotion…” (Yu Guangyuan, 2003, 11) 
 
Three levels of decentralization were to include: administrative 
decentralization; fiscal decentralization; and industrial policy and infrastructure-
supporting investment decentralization (Yusuf, 1994, 3). With the administrative 
decentralization, more power was diffused from central government to local 
governments, giving these local governments more room to adopt and implement 
new market-friendly reform policies (Yusuf, 1994, 3). Fiscal decentralization 
allowed the local governments to retain their tax revenues themselves instead of 
delivering them to the center (Yusuf, 1994, 3). These lower levels of government 
now were responsible for the prosperity of the local economy through the power to 
collect surcharges, fees and various duties, and to control the budgets of 
provincially-owned state enterprises (Yusuf, 1994, 3). Thirdly, decentralization of 
industrial policy and infrastructure-supporting investment dispersed central control 
over industrial decision-making to provincial bureaus (Yusuf, 1994, 3).  
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Apart from transferring of power from central to local governments, 
decentralization also involved devolving power directly from any layer of 
government to the enterprise – the process which White differentiates into 
“administrative” and “economic” decentralization (White, 1993, 45).27  The state 
played less direct role, giving more decision-making power to the enterprise (White, 
1993, 46). The monopolistic character of state gradually began to be eliminated with 
the emergence of “multi-interests” in the economy (Wen Tiejun, 2003, 48).  
Though decentralization as an attempt to cope with the changing 
environment since the reform began, bringing about more flexibility to the 
functioning of economy, the power still remained in the hands of the state. Strict 
policies under government plan existed in SOEs (State Owned Enterprises) in China, 
such as laying off their preexisting workers were not possible, nor could they leave 
the enterprises without permission (Lau, 2000, 135). Strong administrative 
interventions continued throughout the reform era of 1980s bringing about various 
success to the economy, as could be seen in a record trade surplus of US $13.1 
billion in 1990 (Lardy, 1992, 146). While pursuing the open-door strategies in 
accordance to the spirit of reform, it was the state which designed and implemented 
the policies as a way of protecting domestic market. They were realized through 
export subsidies and import curbing. The measures vary from direct quantitative 
limit to various product standards and inspection procedures on imported goods. As 
Lardy indicates: 
For example in 1988 the state imposed curbs on imports of 
some 100 machinery products that were produced by enterprises under 
the Ministry of Aeronautics Industry. The state designed these 
                                                
27
 The change in the system which White refers to was made from “vertical” relationships between 
enterprises and the supervisory state organs towards “horizontal” links between different enterprises 
(White, 1993, 46). 
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restrictions to protect the domestic production of a broad range of 
products, including buses, motorcycles and many types of machinery 
products (Liu, 1988). In mid-1989 there were further adjustments to 
the trade regime that provided the Ministry of Foreign Economic 
Relations and Trade with more control of the volume of imports, 
particularly at local levels (Yuan, 1989). By 1990 the state had 
imposed import bans on approximately 80 types of products and 
materials (Office of the US Trade Representative, 1991: 45) (Lardy, 
1992, 147).  
 
Privatization in Turkey 
 Turkey’s state economic enterprises (SEEs) originate from the “Etatist” 
period of the 1930s. The SEEs have always played the central role in the 
industrialization process of Turkey since then, even during the post-1950 period 
when private business emerged as another important actor. The importance of the 
SEEs is reflected in their contribution to total industrial production and to overall 
capital formation. The SEEs accounted for about 40 percent of total value added in 
the manufacturing industry, and accounted for more than 50 percent of total fixed 
capital formation during the 1980s (Onis, 1991, 164).  
 However questions lingered about the performance of the public-enterprise 
sector as their operating losses grew, and so has the central government’s budget to 
finance them, which resulted in accelerating inflation. Some of the apparent 
problems were: the absence of autonomy and managerial incentives; frequent 
interference from politicians and bureaucrats; and failure of the state-enterprise 
sector to provide incentives to the managerial elite (Onis, 1991, 164). It is highly 
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understandable that pressure to improve performance of the SEEs which have been 
operating under the highly monopolistic or oligopolistic market system during the 
1960s and 1970s was very low, if not inexistent. 
 Since the second half of the 1970s, proposals and attempts to reform the SEEs 
began to gain momentum. However, although Turkey shifted toward more 
liberalized market-oriented system in the 1980s, privatization of the SEEs was slow 
to be realized. The reform attempt during 1980 and 1984 was led by the World Bank 
and the IMF from whom Turkey obtained structural adjustment loans (SALs). Under 
the SAL program, public-enterprise reform could be made through: “improving 
short-term financial structure; redirecting investment programs and financing them 
from non-budget sources; and changing the role of the SEEs to support the private 
sector” (Onis, 1991, 165).  
It was with the Ozal government that pressure for reform was strengthened. 
Along with the introduction of trade and capital-account liberalization policies, 
privatization was put on the policy agenda in 1984. The State Planning Organization 
which was to be the leading organ commissioned the Morgan Guaranty Trust to 
organize the plan for the task of privatization. The report was submitted by the 
Morgan Bank in May 1986 whose main objective was to rank enterprises according 
to their suitability for divestiture. The enterprise was ranked according to the 
economic viability indicating the current operating profitability and market potential, 
which then decided its “saleability” (Onis, 1991, 166).  The report implies foreign 
investors as the principal candidates for taking over the companies to be divested 
based on the tendency that investment from overseas would provide capital as well as 
technical know-how, and would promote the competitiveness of the companies 
divested. 
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 An important point is worth made regarding the Turkish experiment of 
privatization. Privatization in Turkey did not necessarily mean a retreat of the state. 
As Ziya Onis argues, liberalization and privatization in Turkey did not automatically 
lead to a “retreat of the state,” but was followed by “reorganization” or 
“reconstitution” (Onis, 1991, 167). This could be understood when one examines the 
means through which privatization was implemented. Except for the direct sales of 
SEE assets, other instruments such as offers to sell management rights of an 
enterprise and offers of certificates entitling the public to a share in the operating 
income of the enterprise, as was the case of Teletas, a telecommunications company, 
whose shares were sold through 4,822 branch banks and completely transferred to 
the public, did not result in a total retreat of the state, but rather showed how 
government reorganized the structure of the economy.  
 That privatization did not necessarily mean a retreat of the state is also shown 
in the initiative aims behind privatization in Turkey. What privatization aimed at in 
the eyes of the Turkish policymakers was to establish a well-developed capital 
market.  Government aimed at incorporating a large number of middle-income 
populations into the privatization process, which in turn would establish “popular 
capitalism” by extending property ownership to wider segments of the society (Onis, 
1991, 168). 
Turkey’s case of privatization process, however, cannot be said to have 
shown its full performance due to several reasons. First, Turkey’s macroeconomic 
environment was not suitable enough for political rationality to come true. Ozal’s 
post-1983 policies of tariff reform, the opening up of the capital account, and 
incentives to direct foreign investment coexisted with growing macroeconomic 
imbalances resulting from a public-sector based expansionist strategy, which 
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provided a hurdle for a full-scale privatization (Onis, 1991, 170). Secondly, 
institutional constraints blocked a more successful privatization drive in Turkey. The 
capital market was not developed enough to manage the privatization process. Weak 
capital market led to a weak financial base which in turn made large domestic 
corporations in Turkey who could have emerged as potential participants in the 
privatization process now depend on short-term bank financing (Onis, 1991, 171).  
By the end of 1989, the process of privatization began to display certain 
deficiencies, such as the absence of regulatory framework, chronic inflation, high 
interest rates, and increasing external debts. 
 
4.4 China’s Reform Priority on Agriculture 
One distinct contrasting point of the developmental history of China to that 
of Turkey is that China acknowledged the importance of reforming agriculture as the 
very base of further industrial reform. Whereas Turkey experienced an intensive 
development of agriculture during the period 1965-1979 with development plans and 
agricultural support policies, however with the beginning of the reform era since 
1980, no special policies were included in regards to agricultural sector. Under the 
supervision of International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB), the 
agricultural support policies were to be reduced and so were the credit supported for 
the purchases of unions of agricultural sales cooperatives (UASCs) nor is any 
brighter future guaranteed by the continuing programs of structural adjustment as 
could be understood from the Letter of Intent submitted to the IMF on March 10, 
2000:  
In the agricultural sphere, the Government intends to break with 
the past once and for all in order to boost growth and reduce the burden 
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of agricultural support policies on the budget and the consumers. The 
medium-term objective is to substitute the existing system relying on 
support through government subsidized inputs and credit and price 
support for major commodities by a program of direct income support 
targeting ever more small farmers…In line with the medium-term 
objective of the withdrawal of the state from a direct part in agricultural 
production and agri-business, the agricultural reform program includes 
the commercialization and privatization of state asserts in the sector 
(Oyan, 2002, 61) 
Since the 1980 reform, one of the major contributing facts to systematic development 
of agriculture in Turkey began to fade slowly – the state power to initiate and 
implement. 
 On the contrast China’s reform policies were initiated with agricultural 
reform and give the state major control over it in the continuing future. Reform Phase 
One (1979-1984) focused mainly on planning and implementing rural economic 
institutions in order to bring about changes in the existing agricultural system. The 
period coincided with the increasing number of pro-Deng reformists in the top posts 
which accelerated the speed of the reform process. The major change has been made 
to the previous system of commune based collective agricultural production system. 
It was transformed into more private-based ‘responsibility system’ where the 
production team made up of 30 families worked as the unit and was rewarded 
according to the unit’s work effort (Perkins, 1988, 608). The reward to the work 
effort of farmers was received through “work points” which were calculated based 
on the amount of work each unit’s farmers performed and were divided equally 
among the farmers of each unit and distributed in the form of incomes (Perkins, 1988, 
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608). The basic idea behind ‘responsibility system’ was based on the framework of 
socialist market system, which accentuated devolving responsibility from the 
collective unit to smallest unit possible, which in this case was represented by 
individual peasants (White, 1993, 54).  
The agricultural decollectivisation launched in 1979 has transformed most of 
the collective forms of the ‘responsibility system to individual household farming 
(Perkins, 1988, 609). By 1983, “rural people’s commune” was abolished which 
epitomized the demise of team farming and de facto beginning of household 
agriculture based on 15 year contracts with the state to use the land (Perkins, 1994, 2). 
By 1984 the growth rate of agricultural value added grew five times that of 1957 
(Perkins, 1994, 14). What enabled such a growth was not only the adoption of new 
‘responsibility system’ but the changes in macro-economic policy which bolstered 
such attempts.  
In terms of macro-economic policy, changes took place that would further 
support the move toward market-oriented agriculture within the context of socialist 
market system. Whereas the previous system depended mainly on the grain purchase 
quotas and subsidies by the government, the new reform policy allowed the state to 
increase the procurement prices (by an average of 31 per cent between 1978 and 
1980 and 13 per cent between 1980 and 1983) (White, 1993, 54). The increase in the 
prices of agricultural goods narrowed the gap between the prices of agricultural and 
industrial goods. Incentive prices to certain crops by government were used in order 
to encourage agricultural diversification, such as cotton. Outside the state planned 
quotas, the amount of agricultural goods which the peasant households could sell was 
increased, and such encouragement of commercialization of agriculture was another 
step toward establishing socialist market system (White, 1993, 54). 
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4.5 Foreign Direct Investment   
In the case of China 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in China has been the major driving force 
behind its successful economic growth. Both quantitatively and qualitatively, 
China’s power to attract FDI has advanced that of any other developing countries. 
Apart from the cheap and skilled labor in China, the effort of Chinese government 
through designing necessary institutions also played an important role in China’s 
success to attract ever increasing amount of FDI during the reform era. 
The turning point of the Chinese reform history was marked by “The Law of 
the People’s Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign 
Investment” which was promulgated and adopted in July 1979, marking the 
beginning of surging external contacts of China (Friedrich Wu, 1981, 474). The 
document became the foundation for the other laws on foreign investments that 
followed. China developed further its legal infrastructure for the foreign-invested 
enterprises (FIEs) with the passage of the “Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprise Law” 
in 1986 and the “Sino-Foreign Cooperative Joint Venture Law” in 1988, laying the 
legal ground for the three main forms of FIEs—equity joint ventures, cooperative 
joint ventures, and wholly foreign-owned subsidiaries (Huang, CER, 2003, 405). 
With the decree of the “Regulations to Encourage Foreign Investments” by the State 
Council in 1986, China’s FDI regulatory regime moved further from “permitting” to 
“encouraging” FDI (Huang, CER, 2003, 405). Such regulatory practices by the 
Chinese government continued in the 1990s with special effort to cope with 
international environment. With China’s accession to the World Trade Organization 
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in 2001, China was obligated to allow foreign firms to own up to 50 percent of FIEs 
in the telecom and insurance industries (Huang, CER, 2003, 407).  
As a result of FDI policies implemented by the government, FDI in China 
has grown enormously since early 1980s. From early 1980s to 1990s, annual 
contracted FDI inflow to China has grown from about $ 1.5 billion to about $ 40 
billion in 1999, and actual FDI inflow from about $ 0.5 billion to more than $ 40 
billion (Fung, 2002, 2 of 34). In 2001, FDI in China was $45 billion, and in 2002 
China outranked the US as the most attractive destination for FDI (Huang, Carnegie 
Endowment, 2003).28 Today China accounts for 1/4 to 1/3 of total FDI inflow to the 
developing countries (Fung, 2002, 2 of 34).  
The increasing importance of FDI in Chinese economy is apparent from the 
fact that the share of FDI in total annual investment in fixed assets grew from 3.8 
percent in 1981 to 11-17 percent during the 1990s (Huang, Carnegie Endowment, 
2003, and Fung, 2002, 2 of 34). FDI in China is also closely related with the exports 
as could be seen by the fact that the increase in exports in the pre-1997 period 
coincided with the increase in FDI in labor intensive industries (Huang, Carnegie 
Endowment, 2003, 1 of 3). China’s export production could literally have been 
impossible without overflowing FDI. Apart from such tangible results, China 
benefited from FDI inflows through technological “know-how transfer” from these 
foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) to the Chinese firms—what could be called 
spillover effect (Cheung, 2004, 26).  
 
 
                                                
28
 It is important to note that the foreign capital China receives is mainly in the form of Foreign Direct 
Investment, the long-term capital providing China with stability in comparison to the short-term 
capital. More than two thirds of foreign capital that China received between 1979 and 2000 were in 
the form of direct investment (Fung, 2002, 5 of 34). 
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In the Case of Turkey  
Turkey attracts relatively low volume of foreign direct investment compared 
to the other developing countries of comparable size. The amount of FDI Turkey 
attracted in 1971 was only $300 million, and the average annual inflow of FDI up 
until 1980 was only $90 million (Ogutcu, OECD Conference, 2002). It is true that 
with Turkey’s shift from import substitute policy to export-oriented policy in the 
mid-1980s has increased the amount of FDI inflow, reaching $1 billion in 1990.29 
However since then, FDI flows per annum remained static while global FDI flow 
was accelerating rapidly. How should one explain the still low level of FDI since 
Turkey’s shift from a protectionist trade regime to a more liberalized export-oriented 
regime since mid-1980s? Apart from the criticism on the weak financial structures of 
medium-and small-scale domestic firms in Turkey which allowed foreign investors 
to take over these firms as a tool to increase their control over the internal market 
(Onis, 1998, 317), the main arguments lie in both unstable macro-economic character 
and in the “too liberal” policies of Turkey. 
Although Turkey with its huge economic size and labour force might have 
attracted the foreign investors 30 , its persistent political and economic instability 
renounced those advantageous economic potentials. What foreign firms take into 
consideration when determining their investment decisions, apart from low 
efficiency wage rates, natural resource endowments, or per capita income levels and 
growth performance which Turkey seems to possess, include political stability, and 
price and exchange rate stability, which could hardly be found in the case of 
                                                
29
 That Turkey’s highly protectionist import-substitution strategy led to such a low level of FDI is a 
widely shared point of view among scholars, which is in line with Bhagwati’s thesis that “the 
magnitude of FDI inflows and their efficacy in promoting economic growth will be greater over the 
long haul in countries pursuing the export promotion strategy than in countries pursuing the import 
substitution strategy” (Bhagwati, 1978, 1985, in Togan and Balasubramanyam, 1995, 119). 
30
 Turkey as a middle income developing country was considered to possess both well developed 
infrastructure such as transportation, finance and banking, and geographical advantages bordering 
Middle East and Europe (Togan and Balasubramanyam, 1995, 117). 
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Turkey.31 Endemic macroeconomic instability and chronically high rates of inflation, 
originating from the state’s fiscal problems which emerged in the 1970s largely due 
to a high public sector borrowing, have offered the major obstacles for attracting 
foreign investors.  
Another reason why Turkey has failed to attract expected amount of FDI lies 
in its liberalization policy per se. Study on Turkey’s liberalization policy reveals that 
the policies of Turkey towards FDI are much more liberal than those of other 
developing countries of larger FDI inflows. Based on the principle of “equal 
treatment of domestic and foreign firms,” Turkey “moved too far” in directing its 
liberalization policies (Onis, 1998, 311, and Togan and Balasubramanyam, 1995, 
123). Reorganization of bureaucracy was realized in 1984 when Foreign Investment 
Department of the State Planning Organization was established to handle foreign 
investment approvals. With the creation of this single agency, the problems 
generated by the fragmented nature of the bureaucracy were eliminated (Onis, 1998, 
185). Turkish law relating to foreign capital confers all the rights and obligations 
afforded to local nationals on foreign investors. This was made possible by making 
consistent the foreign investment Code with the OECD norms, the act which 
rendered foreign and domestic investors subject to equal treatment before the law 
(Onis, 1998, 185). Turkey provides a wide range of investment incentives to foreign 
firms, but does not implement any policies of regulations such as local content 
requirements and employment regulations, as is the case of other developing 
countries. The climax of such liberalization process was marked in 1986 when 100 
percent foreign ownership became attainable for all foreign investors in all sectors 
(Onis, 1998, 311). No ceiling exists on the amount of equity foreign firms may own. 
                                                
31
 The importance of “policy environment” of the host country is well described in Ziya Onis, State 
and Market: the Political Economy of Turkey in Comparative Perspective, Istanbul: Bogazici Univ, 
1998. 
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The law does not put any restrictions on the foreign investors who whish to transfer 
their profits abroad. It also has established Free Port Zones as an attempt to attract 
inward FDI, create more employment and transfer technology. However as Togan 
and Balasubramanyam argue, Turkish experience of FPZs only helps reiterate the 
fact that Turkey’s framework of policies towards FDI were too generous to achieve 
their original goals.  
Despite such liberal policies giving adamant power to the foreign firms 
operating in Turkey, it failed to derivate these gains to domestic economy. The 
following table compares the actual inflow of Turkey in comparison to that of China 
during the first decade since the reform policies of early 1980s. 
 
China and Turkey 
Actual FDI Inflow in Turkey and China 1980-1990 (in $ Millions) 
Year * 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Turkey 18 46 113 99 125 115 354 663 684 810 
China 1166 636 1258 1661 1874 2314 3194 3392 3487 4366 
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Turkey 844 636 608 885 722 805 940 783 982 3266 
China 11007 27515 33767 37521 41725 45257 45463 40319 40715 37253 
Source: for Turkey: SPO (State Planning Organization) based on Undersecretariat of 
Turkey and Central Bank , and for China: PRC National Bureau of Statistics (Yearly 
Data 2000, Chapter 17. Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, 17-13. Utilization 
of Foreign Capital). 
*Due to availability of the data, this period indicates 1980 for Turkey and 1979-1982 
for China. 
 
4.6 Financial Reform 
In the Case of China 
 In hew to the scope of socialist market system, the financial reform also 
reflected the basic element of the unique system of China – state control. Chinese 
financial market remaining closed does not necessarily implicate, however, that there 
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was no attempt at all towards reform policies within the field. As many would argue, 
especially emphasized by those who advocate the neo-liberal point of view, China 
did undergo several reform attempts since 1979.  
One of them is the move from mono-banking system to a two-tiered banking 
system. On the contrary to the previous system where the only key institution was the 
People’s Bank of China32 which alone handled most of the financial matters of the 
country, under the two-tired banking system, the burden of the PBC was dispersed 
among several other institutions allowed. 33  Diversification was the major 
consequence of such a reform attempt which restored the credit of Agricultural Bank 
to handle funds for working capital in rural areas and established the Industrial and 
Commercial Bank to manage the urban industrial and commercial enterprises 
(McCormick and Unger, 1996, 161). A separate institution was also established to 
administer foreign exchange transactions (McCormic and Unger, 1996, 161). With 
all these institutions sharing the work, the PBC was now responsible for larger issues 
of government’s finances, macro-financial economic issues, and for overseeing the 
loan activities of the specialized banks (McCormick and Unger, 1996, 161). As the 
result of the initial reform policies, local governments, enterprises and households 
now also became the recipients of the financial resources once under full control of 
central planning and financial authorities (McCormick and Unger, 1996, 162).  
The reform policies in the late 1979 seem to show that China has, as many 
other developing countries of contemporary era including Turkey, embodied the 
                                                
32
 Two other specialized banks existed to assist the work of PBC: the Bank of China responsible for 
foreign exchange transactions; and the People’s Construction Bank of China responsible for granting 
fixed capital grants from the state budget (McCormick and Unger, 1996, 159). The previous agency 
was under the supervision of the PBC, and the latter of the Ministry of Finance (ibid). 
33
 As would be discussed later, such a dispersion of financial responsibilities and the diversification 
corollary to this policy cannot be judged on the absolute terms. Similar to today’s phenomena, the 
rather centralized and even more closed financial system of China before 1979 was praised by today’s 
scholars to have contributed to the maintenance of stability and high rates of other macro-economic 
indicators, such as growth rates and investment rates during then (McCormick and Unger, 1996, 160). 
The similar analysis is still applicable today.  
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popular move towards opening up. The reform attempt continued throughout 80s and 
90s when new financial institutions emerged and further push towards two-tiered 
banking system continued. However, though not meaninglessly small, such a step 
was not huge enough to bring any crucial changes to the overall financial system of 
China.  
 China’s financial market still remained closed and continued to function 
under tight state control. One recent example exists in the field of local equity market, 
two-thirds of which still is owned by the state and thus cannot be traded on stock 
exchanges (22 May, 2005, the New York Times). The reforms sponsored by the 
central government were problematic in four dimensions. First, the reform was 
directed mainly to the state-owned banking system and merely to anything else. 
Administering funds to public sector was delegated to the state banks that were 
functioning as administrative organs of the state (Bell (IMF), 1993, 31). Second, the 
scope of the reform was too narrow thus restricted. Third it lacked financial market 
since what operated the economy was not market but the central financial planners of 
the state which at the same time restricted the autonomy of the banks. Consequently, 
the banking system lacked any autonomy to set any policies of its own, having no 
independent monetary policy, but was a mere puppet of the huge strong central 
authorities (Lou Jiwei (WB), 1997, 38). Lastly, the fact that some elements of market 
system were allowed as the result of the reform led to the dualist tendency of the 
economy, where the economic actors such as enterprises now had to cope with 
increased chaos. In brief, the contents of the reform policies merely implied the move 
from “formal to informal methods of regulation and control” and what remained 
unchanged was the still strong influence of state in all dimensions of Chinese 
economy (McCormick and Unger, 1996, 156).  
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 While reform policies were being designed and implemented, with state 
initiation being the pivot, the external pressure to further open up mainly continued 
in regards to its exchange rate regime. Chinese exchange regime, after having gone 
through several changes during the last two decades of reform history, established a 
de facto US dollar-pegged system since 1994 (Huang and Wang, 2004, 337). Though 
the regime was of a managed-float kind with a narrow band, it operated de facto 
pegged to the dollar. Such a regime which on the one hand allowed a certain degree 
of flexibility but delimiting the fluctuations within a narrow band, alongside the tight 
capital control by the state enabled China to witness high and stable economic 
growth since then (Huang and Wang, 2004, 338).34 
 With China’s further integration into the world economy, one example being 
the accession to the World Trade Organization in 200135, it has been speculated that 
the next step would take China to carry out capital account liberalization (Lin and 
Schramm, 2003, 247). Such a pressure, however, has long been encountered with 
Beijing’s continuous confrontation. The logic behind such an encounter mainly is 
rooted in the acknowledged danger of what open financial/capital market would 
bring about. The distrust and the fear against the speculative market has been the 
major reason behind China’s struggle. Fan Gang, director of the National Economic 
Research Institute China Reform Foundation, asserts, allowing greater fluctuation of 
exchange rate by appreciating the Yuan has been given a special attention by the 
                                                
34 The success could also be seen from China’s current account and capital account 
surpluses with the implementation of the regime since 1994. China’s story has been 
analyzed to owe its success to “the artificially low value of the Chinese currency 
against the dollar” which with further depreciation against other currencies allowed 
Chinese exports advantageous against not only United States but also other parts of 
the world including Europe (Barboza and Kahn, July 22, 2005, New York Times). 
35
 The requirements for China’s accession to WTO included liberalization of various economic 
spheres including trade and other investment areas including agriculture, telecommunications and 
financial services, which once actualized would threaten current foreign exchange regime and make 
capital account liberalization inevitable (Lin and Schramm, 2003, 263). 
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Chinese policy makers due to its sensitivity and risky character (Asia Times, 
19/01/2005, “Beijing will hold the peg”). Having control over the currency was 
considered tantamount to “a matter of China’s sovereignty” as recently declared by 
Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao (Barboza and Kahn, July 22, 2005, New York 
Times).  
 However, despite such a harsh struggle, China yielded to the global pressure 
finally. Marking another milestone in the Chinese history of reform, and as in line 
with this thesis of mine, China ended its previous regime of a de facto peg to the US 
dollar on 21 of July, 2005. This move representing a closer step towards liberal 
market system was launched with China’s Central Bank announcing that Yuan would 
rise to 8.11 from 8.28, a 2.1 percent increase, to US dollar, ending its decades-long 
policy of US dollar –peg regime (Goodman, July 21, 2005, Washington Post). The 
move was welcomed by the United States as reflected in the statement of John W. 
Snow, Treasury Secretary of United States: “I welcome China’s announcement today 
that it is adopting a more flexible exchange rate regime. As we have said, reform of 
China’s currency regime is important for China and the international financial 
system” (Barboza and Kahn, July 22, 2005, New York Times). 
 What makes the move more important, however, is the risk that it harbors. 
The gradual appreciation of the Yuan as the result of this first step is highly likely to 
attract huge inflow of speculative money into China, which would inevitably result in 
increase in inflation and asset bubbles in China (Barboza and Kahn, July 22, 2005, 
New York Times). In other words, once the capital inflow seems to increase, the 
speculative character of the market stimulates the expectation of the global financial 
market towards further inflow, which in the end results in uncontrollable and risky 
financial environment filled with short termed hot-money. As Nicholas R. Lardy, a 
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senior fellow at the Institute for International Economics in Washington indicates, 
“(such a move) creates the expectation of more moves so there could be even more 
speculative inflow” (Barboza and Kahn, July 22, 2005, New York Times). 
 The fact that such a move contains danger has been a long contested issue. 
The irrevocability of the negative impact of capital liberalization on the overall 
economy is well represented in the term “policy trilemma.” The term indicates the 
difficulty, if not impossibility, of the “trinity”: financial-market integration through 
controlling capital mobility, the exchange rate stability, and monetary independence 
(Lin and Schramm, 2003, 264 and Huang and Wang, 2004, 340). In this global 
economy, it is impossible to satisfy all three goals but must leave out one in order to 
satisfy the other two. To apply the theory to Chinese case, if China wishes to 
maintain its monetary independence, considering the pressure that joining to the 
globalization process would have upon Chinese economy, the tradeoff between 
capital mobility control and exchange rate stability is the cost that it would have to 
pay (Lin and Schramm, 2003, 264 and Huang and Wang, 2004, 340).  
 U.S. policymakers are still criticizing China for manipulating its currency 
claiming that it gives China an unfair competitive advantage in international trade 
(October 14, 2005, the Globalist). The charge for “currency manipulation” is 
grounded on the basic ideology of International Financial Institutions, such as IMF as 
written in IMF Article IV: 
In particular, each member shall: …avoid manipulating exchange rates 
or the international monetary system in order to prevent effective 
balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive 
advantage over other members.” (IMF Article IV, Section 1)36  
                                                
36
 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/aa04.htm 
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“To accord with the development of the international monetary system, 
the Fund, by an eighty-five percent majority of the total voting power, 
may make provision for general exchange arrangements without 
limiting the right of members to have exchange arrangements of their 
choice consistent with the purposes of the Fund and the obligations 
under Section 1 of this Article… (IMF Article IV, Section 2)37 
Such a view is also supported by WTO, as clearly laid down in the Article XV (on 
Exchange Arrangements) of the GATT (the predecessor organization of today’s 
WTO): 
1.         The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall seek co-operation with 
the International Monetary Fund to the end that the CONTRACTING 
PARTIES and the Fund may pursue a co-ordinated policy with regard 
to exchange questions within the jurisdiction of the Fund and questions 
of quantitative restrictions and other trade measures within the 
jurisdiction of the CONTRACTING PARTIES.  
2.         In all cases in which the CONTRACTING PARTIES are called 
upon to consider or deal with problems concerning monetary reserves, 
balances of payments or foreign exchange arrangements, they shall 
consult fully with the International Monetary Fund…(Legal Texts of 
GATT, Article XV)38 
With its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, China 
took another step toward global financial integration. As summarized in the words of 
Eswar Prasad, Chief of Asia and Pacific Department of IMF, the actors of pro-
financial liberalization “think it is really in China’s own interest to move towards a 
                                                
37
 ibid. 
38
 http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_01_e.htm 
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more flexible exchange rate regime because it would give China an autonomous 
monetary policy and would help the economy adjust much better as its outward 
orientation increases.”39 
 Not only the very nature of open financial market may bring harm to Chinese 
society, but also the consequential chaos that the coexistence of financial openness to 
the outside world and the traditional domestic financial institutions would bring also 
offer another reason behind gloomy Chinese future. Whatever the future speculation 
might be, it is an undoubted fact that China’s relatively closed financial policies did 
brought about further economic success by preventing the financial malaise, which 
often emerge in the form of crises, that other countries such as Turkey had to fight in 
the latter years.  
 
In the Case of Turkey 
 Capital account liberalization in Turkey was launched in 1983, right after the 
decision to adopt a major stabilization-cum structural program as assisted by IMF 
and the World Bank in 1980.  
Apart from the fact that Turkey’s early integration into the world market 
naturally accompanied opening up its financial market, its domestic political 
situation offers another explanation behind its early financial integration with the 
international market. After the end of the military rule in November 1983, and after 
experiencing a short period of absence of political competition until 1987, Turkey 
during late 1980s and early 1990s was undergoing an important period of 
“distributional conflict in a reconstituted democratic environment” (Onis, 1998, 517). 
For instance, the coalition government of DYP-SHP faced since their entering the 
                                                
39
 Transcript of an IMF Economic Forum, October 19, 2004. “China in the Global Economy: 
Prospects and Challenges”, Washington DC.: IMF. 
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office in 1991 the dilemma of attempt to implement stabilization program in the 
situation where the constituents of the supporters prevented the government from 
doing so (Onis, 1998, 518). Having failed to implement the stabilization program of 
its own, the government turned instead to large amount of short-term capital which 
offered the politicians an alternative to solve the distributional dilemmas.  
 
Turkey 
 Selected Balance of Payments Indicators ($ Millions)  
 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
1.Current Account 
Balance -1265 -1413 -3408 -1936 -952 -1923 -1439 -1013 -1465 -806 
2.Overall Balance of 
Capital Movements -26 -112 90 -5 168 152 -66 124 790 969 
Direct Investment 34 75 18 95 55 46 113 99 125 106 
Portfolio Investment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 146 282 
Other Long-Term Capital 1681 1535 2029 998 1029 660 1614 163 1041 1453 
Short-Term Capital 402 -1000 -2 121 98 798 -652 1479 812 50 
 
 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
1.Current Account 
Balance 1596 961 -2625 250 -974 -6433 2631 -2339 -2437 -2638 
2.Overall Balance of 
Capital Movements 890 2762 1308 -1029 1484 308 206 4658 4545 3344 
Direct Investment 354 663 700 783 779 622 559 772 612 554 
Portfolio Investment 1178 1586 547 623 2411 3917 1158 237 570 1634 
Other Long-Term Capital 209 885 -210 -783 -938 1370 -784 -79 1636 4788 
Short-Term Capital -2281 -554 3000 -3020 1396 3054 -5127 3713 5945 1761 
Source: Various Issues of OECD Economic Surveys: Turkey. 
  
The huge inflow of short-term capital into Turkey accompanied with its full 
liberalization of capital account since 1989 led to an unstable and inconsistent 
economic growth (Balkan and Savran, 2002, 41). The sudden decrease of the annual 
growth from 1993 to 1994 which fell from 8.0 percent to -5.5 percent is only a partial 
 62 
example of how an economy open to hot money could be affected. The same pattern 
of unstable fluctuation applies to other indicators of the economy such as balance on 
current account. 
 The Turkish economy with an open financial system experienced a vicious 
circle that brought the cyclical financial crises to the economy in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s. As Ziya Onis summarizes, the inflows of foreign capital results in sharp 
appreciation of the real exchange rate in a country like Turkey where it lacks 
adequate filtering mechanisms, which in turn offers the authorities a good alternative 
of short-term anti-inflationary instrument (Onis, 1998, 525). This overvaluation of 
the domestic currency, leading to an import boom due to cheapening of imports and 
export stagnation results in increase in trade deficit and large current account deficit 
leading to the distorted and fragile balance of payments structure (Onis, 1998, 525, 
Balkan and Savran, 2002, 43). As Boratav, Turel and Yeldan summarizes: 
 
…the post-1990 Turkish experience shows the serious problems 
confronting a developing economy which decides to move into full 
external and internal deregulation in the financial system under 
conditions of high inflation. The specter of capital flight becomes the 
dominant motive in policy-making and creates commitment to high 
interest rates and expectations for cheap foreign exchange. The links of 
these two policy variables with the real sphere of the economy, i.e. 
investment on physical capital and the current account balance of 
payments, are deeply severed. Instability in the rates of foreign 
exchange and interest rages creates feedbacks which lead the economy 
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into further instability (Boratav, Turel and Yeldan, 1995 in Balkan and 
Savran, 2002, 43). 
 
Examining the budget deficit of years between 1980 and 1989 supports the negative 
impact of financial liberalization on the government to raise funds at market-related 
interest rates. 
 
Turkey 
Central Government Budget (1980-1990)(TL billions) 
Year 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Budge
t 
balanc
e 
-166.2 -123.6 -157.3 -312.6 -978.7 -798.2 -1411.5 -2607.4 -3990.2 -7672 -14202 
Trans
fers 397.9 571.6 548.1 1071.4 1602.8 2187.7 3490.1 5863.5 
10420.
8 
16377.
9 25363 
Of 
which 
intere
st 
paym
ents 
31.5 75.3 87.4 211.4 440.8 675.0 1331.1 2266.4 4977.8 8259.5 14600 
Source: OECD Economic Survey: Turkey 1990-91. 
 
Towards the end of the 1980s we can see that the interest payments by government 
itself make up the most part of the budget deficit. 
By 1999 the gross inflow of short-term capital (or hot money) to Turkey 
reached $108.6 billion which makes up 2/3 of the overall Turkish GNP (Balkan and 
Savran, 2002, 48). This indicator only reiterates the declining, if not nonexistent, 
power of domestic system to control its own financial policies from international 
speculative centers, which themselves are accused of provoking financial fragility 
and thus leading to distorted distribution of income (Balkan and Yeldan, 1998; 
Yenturk, 1999 in Balkan and Savran, 2002, 48). 
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The hazards that Turkey witnessed from its early opening up of financial 
market could be briefly listed as the following:  
1) With short-term capital flowing into the domestic economy, the previous role of 
Central Bank (controlling the rates of interest and of foreign exchange) is now 
handed over to the “exclusive directives of external centers” resulting in a continuous 
high real interest rates and an overvalued domestic currency. 
2) Disassociation of the financial and real sectors due to unpredictable inflows and 
outflows of hot money creates bubbles in the stock exchange market. 
3) Continuous speculative capital flows reflect the unstable economic environment in 
Turkey, thus lowering the creditworthiness of Turkey by foreign investors (Balkan 
and Savran, 2002, 49).  
 Turkish experience shows the danger behind fully liberalizing one’s financial 
system under conditions of high inflation. Public sector lost the capacity to generate 
savings and the state sought to finance domestic debt by issuing new debt instrument 
which only triggered further domestic debt. Turkey’s domestic debt stock increased 
from near zero in 1987 to 25-30 percent of GDP by 2000 (Onis, 2003, 7). A vicious 
circle of increase in real interest rates as a result of government’s demand for funds 
caused an increase in interest payments which in turn only contributed to increased 
budget deficits (Onis, 2003, 7). Such a short-sighted government decision to rely on 
the exchange rate and short-term capital inflows as the means of financial 
liberalization only proved how ‘short-termed’ such prescriptions could be.40 
 
 
                                                
40
 As Saracoglu indicates, “policy makers believed that structural adjustment policies could not be 
implemented successfully unless financial markets were deep and mature enough to meet the 
financing needs of an outward oriented economy.” (Saracoglu, 1996 in The Central Bank of Turkey, 
2002, 58). 
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4.7 The Results  
In China Structural Change in the Economy Becomes Reality 
During the 1980s China’s annual GDP rose by about 10 per cent (White, 
1993, 72). Exports also grew rapidly at an average annual growth rate amounting to 
16.7 per cent between 1979 and 1990, enabling China to maintain its current account 
surpluses in all but four years between 1978 and 1992 (White, 1993, 72 and Yusuf, 
1994, 2??). Such improvement of China’s relationship with the international 
economy could be also seen from its performance in its share of global trade which 
increased from 0.8 per cent in 1978 to 1.7 per cent in 1987.41  
China 
China’s Foreign Trade 1978-2000 ($ billions) 
Year Total Exports Imports Balance 
1978 20.64 9.75 10.89 -1.14 
1979 29.34 13.66 15.68 -2.02 
1980 38.14 18.12 20.02 -1.90 
1981 44.03 22.01 22.02 -0.01 
1982 41.61 22.32 19.29 3.03 
1983 43.62 22.23 21.39 0.84 
1984 53.55 26.14 27.41 -1.27 
1985 69.60 27.35 42.25 -14.90 
1986 72.85 30.94 42.91 -11.97 
1987 82.65 39.44 43.21 -3.77 
1988 102.79 47.52 55.27 -7.75 
1989 111.68 52.54 59.14 -6.60 
1990 115.44 62.09 53.35 8.75 
1991 135.63 71.84 63.79 8.05 
1992 165.53 84.94 80.59 4.35 
1993 195.70 91.74 10.396 -12.22 
1994 236.62 121.01 115.61 5.4 
1995 280.86 148.78 132.08 16.7 
1996 289.88 151.05 138.83 12.22 
1997 325.16 182.79 142.37 40.42 
1998 324.05 183.81 140.24 43.57 
1999 360.63 194.93 165.70 29.23 
2000 474.3 249.2 225.1 24.1 
Source: PRC National Bureau of Statistics (Yearly Data 2000, Chapter 17. Foreign 
Trade and Economic Cooperation, 17-3. Total Imports and Exports). 
 
                                                
41
 Peter Nolan. 1990. ‘Introduction’, in Peter Nolan and Fureng Dong (eds.) 1990. The Chinese 
Economy and its Future. Cambridge: Polity Press. 1-38, in Gordon White. 1993. Riding the Tiger: the 
Politics of Economic Reform in Post-Mao China. London: Macmillan. 73. 
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Today, China remains world’s third largest trader, its exports amounting to $ 772 
billion and imports to $ 660.1 billion, and its total amount of trade reaching $ 1.42 
trillion in 2005 (Wei, January 12, 2006, China Daily). Such numeric data contains 
ample meaning to Chinese economy when one considers that China’s trade surplus in 
2005 reached a record of US$ 102 billion, the amount triple that of 2004. 
Ever increasing GDP of China also supports such success of China as 
indicated in the following table: 
China 
China’s GDP and GDP per capita 
Year 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 
GDP 3624.1 4038.2 4517.8 4862.4 5294.7 5934.5 7171.0 8964.4 
GDP 
per 
capita 
(100 
million 
Yuan) 
379 417 460 489 525 580 692 853 
Year 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
GDP 10202.2 11962.5 14928.3 16909.2 18547.9 21617.8 26638.1 34634.4 
GDP 
per 
capita 
(100 
million 
Yuan) 
956 1104 1355 1512 1634 1879 2287 2939 
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
GDP 46759.4 58478.1 67884.6 74462.6 78345.2 81910.9 99215 109656 
GDP 
per 
capita 
(100 
million 
Yuan) 
3923 4854 5576 6053 6392 6506 7880 8709 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005     
GDP 120333 135823 159878 182820     
GDP 
per 
capita 
(yuan) 
9557 10787 12698 14520     
Sources: For years 1978-1999, PRC National Bureau of Statistics (Yearly Data 2000, 
Chapter 3. National Accounts, 3-1. Gross Domestic Product), and for years 2000-
2005, The US-China Business Council, “PRC Economic Statistics,” 
http://www.uschina.org/statistics/economy.html 
 
 67 
The reform process of China since 1978 also influenced the relationship 
between the state and the economy. Diversification of the ownership system and 
greater autonomy for enterprises in the public sector enhanced the balance of power 
between state economic organs and other productive units including enterprises, 
households and firms, the phenomenon which White argues to have triggered the rise 
of a ‘second economy’ which gave these productive units right to ownership (White, 
1993, 73-75). However one should notice that state still kept full control in regards to 
certain major issues such as investment projects, key raw materials and energy inputs 
(White, 1993, 74).  
State regulation was the key word to indicate such a huge success in China’s 
developmental history. Apart from the banking system of China as examined above 
in regards to the financial reform process which gave de facto control to the hands of 
the state, China’s legislation provides state with various means to initiate and control, 
especially in regards to the foreign trade. The Foreign Trade Law of People’s 
Republic of China clearly states in Chapter Three:42 
 Article 18 The authority responsible for foreign trade and economic 
relations under the State Council shall, in collaboration with the 
relevant authorities under the State Council and in accordance with the 
provision of Article 16, Article 1743 of this Law, formulate, adjust and 
publish the list of goods and technologies whose import or export are 
subject to restrictions or prohibitions. 
Upon the approval of the State Council the authority responsible for 
foreign trade and economic relations under the State Council may, 
within the framework of Article 16 and Article 17, independently or in 
                                                
42
 See Appendix 2. 
43
 See Appendix 2. 
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collaboration with the relevant authorities under the State Council 
determine, on a temporary basis, to impose restriction or prohibition on 
the import or export of particular goods or technologies not included in 
the list mentioned in the preceding paragraph.44 
 
Turkey: Results of the Reform Policies since 1980s 
 As statistics reveal, Turkey did seem to have come close to achieving some of 
those goals in the first years as shown by the growth in exports and reduction in 
inflation, and most importantly the restoration of positive growth rates (Dogruel, 
1994, 46). However it is very important to note that, in overall, as the growth rates of 
GNP indicates, the average annual growth rate only reached 4.61 percent, much 
below that achieved between the years 1963 and 1977 when it reached 6.9 percent 
(Dogruel, 1994, 46).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
44
 http://www.chinatoday.com/law/a07.htm 
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Turkey 
Turkey’s Foreign Trade ($ millions) 
Year Total Exports Imports Balance 
1970 1537 589 948 -359 
1980 10819 2,910 7,909 -4999 
1983 14963 5,728 9,235 -3507 
1984 17891 7,134 10,757 -3443 
1985 19301 7,958 11,343 -3385 
1986 18562 7,457 11,105 -3648 
1987 24348 10,190 14,158 -3968 
1988 25997 11,662 14,335 -2673 
1989 27417 11,625 15,792 -4167 
1990 35261 12,959 22,302 -9343 
1991 34641 13,594 21,047 -7453 
1992 37586 14,715 22,871 -8156 
1993 44773 15,345 29,428 -14083 
1994 41379 18,109 23,270 -5161 
1995 57345 21,636 35,709 -14073 
1996 66852 23,225 43,627 -20402 
1997 74820 26,261 48,559 -22298 
1998 72894 26,973 45,921 -18948 
1999 67259 26,588 40,671 -14083 
2000 82278 27,775 54,503 -26728 
2001 71744 31,334 40,410 -9076 
2002 86205 36,059 50,146 -14087 
2003 113995 47,253 66,742 -19489 
2004 157163 63,121 94,042 -30921 
Source: SPO 
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Turkey 
Turkey’s GDP and GDP per capita (billion TL) 
 
Year 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
GDP 5.231 7.901 10.492 13.906 21.997 35.095 51.079 74.722 
GDP 
per 
capita  
116.9 176.6 234.5 310.8 491.6 692.6 1008.1 1474.8 
Year 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
GDP 129.223 227.325 393.060 630.117 1.093.368 
1.981.8
67 
3.868.4
29 
7.762.4
56 
GDP 
per 
capita  
2550.5 4486.8 6960.1 11578.5 19360.8 35094.0 68500.4 125699.6 
Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
GDP 14.772.
110 
28.835.
883 
52.224.
945 
77.415.
272 
124.583
.458 
178.412
.439 
277.574
.057 
359.762
.926 
GDP 
per 
capita  
239208.
9 
466947.
6 
845693.
3 
125360
7.4 
183629
7.9 
262971
0.2 
409130
3.0 
530272
5.9 
Source: Selected Data from Turkish Treasury 
 
Even for the growth that Turkey did achieve, it is worth noted that it is the 
role of the government that de facto contributed the most. As Cecen and Dogruel 
argue, it was the government strategy to reduce the public consumption and increase 
the public investment that enabled the economy to perform strong growth (Dogruel, 
1994, 48). On the contrary, the stabilization and liberalization policies have brought 
various negative impacts to the economy especially in terms of income distribution 
(Dogruel, 1994, 51).45 It is often argued that the inequality in Turkish society owes to 
the embedded dilemma of globalization process per se, that the pressure for further 
populist redistribution has been clashing with the neoliberal goals of integrating into 
the global economy and achieve high growth rate (Onis, 2000, 4). 
                                                
45
 From 1978 to 1988, the share of wages and salaries declined from 35.19 percent to 14.00 percent 
(Dogruel, 1994, 51). 
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Turkey’s reform policies did help Turkey integrate into the world economy. 
However did such integration allow Turkey to achieve its primary goal of economic 
development? The answer is quite negative. Especially after the capital account 
liberalization, the growth rate of Turkey has been growing in volatile and unstable 
manner, as we would be examining in the later part. As summarized by the Central 
Bank of Turkey, major features of Turkish economic policy environment in the 
1980s were “volatile growth rates, high public sector deficits, a chronically high and 
persistent inflation, a deteriorating income distribution, a poorly regulated financial 
system, and high expectations and confidence in the immediate and positive impacts 
of the direct implementation of free market policies.” (Central Bank of Turkey, 2002, 
53)  
 
4.8 Comparison: Turkey versus China during the Reform Era 
Turkey was open to the external influence as a consequence of her early 
interaction with the international society, whereas China remained closed, thus 
refraining itself from any interaction with the outside world, at least during their 
initial phase of reform. Several reasons rendered Turkey to so closely interact with 
the international system since 1980. First, in 1980 Turkey emerged as the test-case 
for the World Bank-IMF joint programme. Second, Turkey was part of the NATO 
alliance and was of strategic importance to the West in regards to its proximity to 
then Soviet Union. Such factor has led Turkey to follow the path of West, or at least 
more easily influenced by them.  
The five structural adjustment loans (SALs) that Turkey received from the 
World Bank became the stepping stones for Turkey’s future economic path. 
However it seemed that Ozal and his government was the one leading the economy, 
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there consistently was World Bank in the background. The direct influence of World 
Bank and the international financial community seemed to have come to an end by 
the end of 1984, when the institutional limit of five SALs was reached. However the 
indirect control of these external institutions still remained since 1984.   
China on the contrary remained relatively closed, still implementing 
restrictive policies on imports and foreign capitals. As the very nature of Socialist 
Market Economy implies, state still holds a high degree of autonomy in both 
designing and implementing economic policies. It is evident from the fact that “in 
China 90 per cent of industrial capital is in state hands, and most land is still 
collectively owned.” (Hirst and Thompson, 1999, 156) The similar case could be 
seen in both the enterprises in China mostly of which still remain state-enterprises, 
and in the equity market where two-thirds of the equity in 1,377 listed companies in 
China are owned by the state (The NYT, “Beijing rules out any role in reforming 
market,” May 22, 2005). The role of government has been compared to that of a 
“parent,” with the ability to combine the roles of government and enterprises, 
managing the economy of the country in a uniform and unified planned manner (Gao, 
2003, 39). 
An explanation from the political dimension is worth noted here. Ziya Onis 
owes it to the very nature of democratic politics.46 Countries of late-industrializing, 
such as Turkey, typically are “in the process of establishing, reestablishing, and 
consolidating their democratic regimes” and “the nature of democratic politics in 
such countries is generally fragile” usually reflected through fragmented party 
system and “a strong legacy of “populism.”” In such a system, politicians tend to 
adopt relatively short time horizons due to obstacles posed by the fragile and 
                                                
46
 For details see Ziya Onis, 1998. State and Market. Istanbul: Bogazici Universitesi, 514. 
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fragmented party system.47 In this short time horizon, it is likely that the type of 
capital politicians utilize is usually “short-term financial capital of a speculative 
nature motivated primarily by interest rate differentials.” Given the nature of such 
capital, or hot-money, any economy built upon such weak and unstable basis is 
doomed to break down. 
What probably might be the most important departure from each other 
between the case of Turkey and China would be in the attitude with regard to 
financial liberalization. Turkey’s adoption of structural program in 1980 and the 
following attempt to liberalize its economy throughout 1980s involved capital 
account liberalization which started in 1983 and which by 1989 reached its climax 
with extremely liberal capital accounts regime. China however, always kept its 
financial market closed though actively participating in other economic activities, at 
least until today. One might say the major reason behind such difference lies in their 
politics based on different ideological regime. However more could be attributed to 
such phenomena.  
The nineteenth-century economist Friedrich List warned in 1841, “the result 
of general free trade would not be a universal republic, but, on the contrary, a 
universal subjection of the less advanced nations to the supremacy of the 
predominant manufacturing, commercial, and naval power…”48 Reckless opening to 
the global economy is too risky especially when considering the volatile and 
                                                
47
 Gunduz Aktan makes the similar argument that a country adopting democracy at a stage when its 
economy has not achieved its full development has the risk of basing its political competence on the 
legacy of populism (Gunduz Aktan, “Turkiye’nin Gelecegi (3).” 05 July, 2005. Radikal Gazetesi,). He 
warns Turkey that if the notion of “development within democracy” is not being separated from the 
notion of populism, (which unfortunately has been the case of Turkey since post war period, author) 
then the firm solution to today’s economic problems would not be possible (ibid.) 
48
 Friedrich List, The National System of Political Economy (Sampson S. Lloyd trans., August M. 
Kelley Publishers 1966), originally published in 1841, in Eisuke Suzuki.2001. “The Fallacy of 
Globalism and the Protection of National Economies,” The Yale Journal of International Law 
26(2):319-322. 
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speculative characteristics of global financial flow.49 For “future national economy” 
to succeed, some kind of supportive measures should be ready before adopting global 
financial policy, both at the domestic and global level (Suzuki, 2001, 322). Or else, 
as the cases of Turkey in the earlier period and China in the later period show, once 
accessed to the global capital movement, any power of governments to command and 
regulate also begins to diminish. 
Could countries choose on their own which type of capital they will attract? 
According to some scholars, yes, and this explains the reason why China was able to 
choose the different path from that of Turkey. Whether a country would utilize short-
term capital (that contains the potential to generate huge economic crises) or long-
term capital (usually in the form of foreign direct investment which is argued to be of 
most benefit to economic growth) depends on “the type of policies or strategies 
adopted by the nation state” (Onis, 1998, 515). The live example of such a statement 
could be China who refused to adopt the international norm of the period regarding 
financial market but kept implementing its own policies to attract foreign direct 
investment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
49
 The volatility of the global financial capital could be seen clearly from the fact that while the private 
capital flows into emerging markets peaked $213 billion in 1996, it suddenly collapsed to $60 billion 
in 1998 (A Council on Foreign Relations Task Force. 1999. “The Future of the International Financial 
Architecture,” Foreign Affairs 78(6): 174). 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
To know the road ahead, ask those coming back. 
--- Ancient Chinese Proverb 
 
In the beginning, the two countries did start with two different socio-
economic and political systems. China with its one party rule adhered to the socialist 
Marxist-Maoist system and Turkey with its capitalist and liberal socio-economic 
pattern, however, have joined the process of globalization almost simultaneously 
since late 1970s (in the case of China) and early 1980s (in the case of Turkey). With 
principles of globalization spreading at its full speed, the pressures the two countries 
had to receive were in resemblance to each others. Both had to cope with whether or 
not, or how to adopt the principles of neoliberalization, the most undeniable 
fundamentals that make up the process of globalization per se. With the aim of 
achieving development from the underdeveloped situation, both responded with 
launching reform policies, considering the risks and opportunities embedded in the 
process.  
However, the way how they did it differed, China mainly relying on the 
power of state and Turkey on that of market. Especially in regards to their different 
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attitudes toward financial liberalization, rather closed China was able to make 
further progress, blocked from various financial crises that Turkey had to face as a 
result of full liberalization. Could such difference as a result of different strategies to 
common external threat and opportunities continue? In other words, will China 
continue to exhibit its success once achieved as a result of different strategies to that 
Turkey, when considering that the history today is experiencing weakening of 
China’s stance against financial liberalization? 
China is growing not only faster enough but also well enough in quality to 
leave the once-dragons-of-Asia behind. However the international stage in which 
China is performing now is not the same as the one in two decades ago, when the 
revival of globalization (or the second age of globalization) began to show its real 
face. International push to liberalize financial market is becoming stronger than ever, 
especially since China’s joining of WTO in 2001. The United States has been 
continuously pushing China to shift its exchange rate to a floating one. This not only 
means that China must slow its growth to avoid an inflationary boom-and-bust cycle, 
but it also means that it needs to create jobs for hundreds of millions of people 
(International Herald Tribune, January 25, 2005). This, however, is not the only 
aspect of current Chinese reform policies that lead to a negative speculation on 
Chinese future. 
The basic idea behind Deng’s socialist market system was ‘to let the 
economy grow but politics stay.’ Until today the idea was accepted and implemented 
without any serious hurdles, since economy was always under political control. 
However as the process of globalization proceeds, or in different terms, as the push 
from U.S. and international financial institutions such as IMF on China to open its 
financial market gets stronger, the consequence would be the reversal of the 
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previous system. Economy would no longer be controllable! How could an economy 
no longer controllable continue in the name of ‘socialist market system?’ Having 
lost its guiding map, further growth would not be possible, especially under a system 
of no title. 
The other possible reason that leads to the negative speculation of Chinese 
future growth would be the possibility of political uprise due to increasing inequality 
and corruption as the result of lost balance between ‘liberal economy’ and 
‘conservative politics’. Further financial liberalization would result in a more 
uncontrollable economy, which in turn would lead to a more vulnerable economic 
system. The issue of the possible political uprise has gained its importance especially 
with the death of Zhao Zi Yang in January 17, 2005, the former Communist Party 
leader who supported students during the 1989 pro-democracy Tiananmen Square 
protests and strongly advocated liberal economic reforms. This very recent incident 
has become the reminder to the public of the Tiananmen incident. As Philip Bowring 
argues in International Herald Tribune, January 18, 2005, although China’s economy 
is growing at a rapid rate, the leadership should notice that several of the conditions 
that led to Tiananmen are present today—corruption, inflation and increasing public 
disturbances that follow. In a more general sense, no development strategies would 
succeed in this system of globalization if designed from the old point of view. It is 
high time to urgently seek alternative ways of development strategy. 
 The example of Turkey proves the fact that capital account liberalization 
generates vulnerability in the economies under process of development. The 
underlying characteristics of capital account liberalization such as unstable exchange 
rates and interest rates narrow planning horizons of policy makers, as was the case of 
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Turkey, thus lead to boom and bust cycles in the economy making it dependent on 
foreign financing based on short-term capital (Central Bank, 2002, 56). 
 As was the case of Turkey, globalization also tends to restrict the state’s 
ability to render welfare provision for the citizens, resulting in an increase in 
dissatisfaction and lack of trust in politics among its citizens (Onis, 2000, 9). It is the 
general expectation that the state conducts its task of guaranteeing social rights of its 
citizens especially in the given condition of unstable and speculative economic 
environment. Undoubtedly the discontent is to continue in the future. 
 When examining the pre-reform era of Turkey during the 1960s and 1970s, it 
was the domestic demand-based state initiation that became the major source of 
growth. Though returning back to such a system might be impossible, if not irrational, 
however, more efficient long-term plans through designing necessary internal 
adjustment could be made when taking these “repercussions of external economic 
conditions” in mind (Dogruel, 1994, 52). 
Examining the experiments of the reform efforts of developing countries, 
two of which has been done in this work of mine, accentuates the important role of 
state in designing and implementing policies to deal with ever stronger push toward 
market-based economies. In other words, the key factor that causes de facto 
difference is the role of national policy options. As Hirst and Thompson indicate, the 
major side-effects to liberalization of economy especially in financial sector could be 
prevented through “active macroeconomic management and prudential domestic 
financial regulation” (Hirst and Thompson, 1999, 154). And from this point of view, 
it was China’s “suspicion in the market forces” that gave power to the state not to the 
market. It was this centralization of power that facilitated major changes to the 
economy once the leaders recognized the necessity for reform (Perkins, 1988, 626). 
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“Globalization is an inherently inegalitarian process” generating a group of 
losers and winners simultaneously (Onis, 2000, 9). That free-market oriented 
globalization process seems to bring hazards to the economies of developing 
countries especially through means of financial liberalization does not mean that we 
should deny the process and start closing their economies from each other. As 
Moises Naim indicates, the solution to prevent reforming economies from powerful 
international shocks lies neither in the whole new “global financial architecture” nor 
in the isolation of the economy through implementing quasi-protectionist obstacles to 
trade and investment flows (Naim, 2000, 5 of 10). The solution rather lies in 
designing and strengthening a set of institutions and policies that could absorb such 
shocks internally, with the help of strong and efficient public sector (Naim, 2000, 7 
of 10). It is important to keep in mind that such policies only could success when the 
uniqueness of each country is taken into consideration. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
The sources of growth of China as divided in the two phases as Reform 
Phase One (1979-1984) and Reform Phase Two (1984-1989) in the text:  
 
Sources of Growth in China 
 Agriculture Industry 
  State Collective 
1978-84    
Sector growth 8.0 8.49 14.03 
TFP* 5.9 3.45 5.2 
1984-88    
Sector growth 4.0 10.22 19.86 
TFP 3.0 3.01 5.86 
Source: (Jefferson, 1992 in Yusuf, 1994, 13??)50 
* indicates Total Factor Productivity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
50
 Gary H. Jefferson, Tom G. Rawski, and Yuxin X. Zheng, “Growth, Efficiency and Convergence in 
China’s State and Collective Industry,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, January 1992, 
40:2, 239-66 in Shahid Yusuf, “China’s Macroeconomic Performance and Management during 
Transition,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Spring 1994, 8:2, 71-93. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
 
 
Foreign Trade Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(Adopted at the Seventh Session of the Standing Committee of the Eighth 
National People’s Congress on May 12, 1994) 
 
Chapter III Import and Export of Goods and Technologies 
Article 15 The State allows free import and export of goods and technologies except 
where laws or administrative regulations provided otherwise. 
 
Article 16 The State may impose restrictions on the import or export of goods and 
technologies in any of the following circumstances: 
1. where the import or export shall be restricted in order to safeguard the national 
security or public interest; 
2. where the export shall be restricted on account of domestic shortage in supply or 
effective protection of exhaustible domestic resources; 
3. where the export shall be restricted due to the limited market capacity of the 
importing country or region; 
4. where the import shall be restricted in order to establish or accelerate the 
establishment of a particular domestic industry; 
5. where the restriction on the import of agricultural, animal husbandry or fishery 
products in any form is necessary; 
6. where the import shall be restricted in order to maintain the State's international 
financial status and the balance of international payments; 
7. where, as the international treaties or agreements to which the People's Republic 
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of China is a contracting party or a participating party require, the import or export 
shall be restricted. 
 
Article 17 The States prohibits the import or export of any goods or technologies in 
any of the following circumstances; 
1. where such goods or technologies will endanger national security or public 
interest; 
2. where the import or export of such goods or technologies must be prohibited in 
order to protect human life or health; 
3. where such goods or technologies will disrupt the ecological environment; 
4. where the import or export of such goods or technologies shall be prohibited in 
accordance with the provisions of international treaties or agreements to which the 
People's Republic of China is a contracting party or a participating party. 
 
Article 18 The authority responsible for foreign trade and economic relations under 
the State Council shall, in collaboration with the relevant authorities under the State 
Council and in accordance with the provision of Article 16, Article 17 of this Law, 
formulate, adjust and publish the list of goods and technologies whose import or 
export are subject to restrictions or prohibitions. 
Upon the approval of the State Council the authority responsible for foreign trade 
and economic relations under the State Council may, within the framework of Article 
16 and Article 17, independently or in collaboration with the relevant authorities 
under the State Council determine, on a temporary basis, to impose restriction or 
prohibition on the import or export of particular goods or technologies not included 
in the list mentioned in the preceding paragraph. 
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Article 19 Goods whose import or export is restricted shall be subject to quota and 
/or licensing control; technologies whose import or export is restricted shall be 
subject to licensing control. 
Import or export of any goods and technologies subject to quota and /or licensing 
control will be effected only with the approval of the authority responsible for 
foreign trade and economic relations under the State Council or the joint approval of 
the preceding authorities and other authorities concerned under the State Council in 
compliance with the provisions of the State Council. 
 
Article 20 Import and export quotas of goods shall be distributed on the basis of the 
conditions including but not limited to the actual import or export performance and 
capability of the applicants in foreign trade dealings and on the basis of the principles 
of efficiency, impartiality, transparency and fair competition by the authority 
responsible for foreign trade and economic relations under the State Council or the 
relevant authorities under the State Council within their respective responsibilities. 
The ways and means of the distribution of quotas are to be regulated by the State 
Council. 
 
Article 21 Where the import or export of goods, articles such as cultural relics, 
wildlife animals, plants and the products there of are prohibited or restricted by other 
laws or administrative regulations, the provisions of the laws and regulations in 
question shall be observed. 
